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EXPANDING JUDICIARIES:  
INDIA AND THE RISE OF THE GOOD 
GOVERNANCE COURT  
NICK ROBINSON∗ 
ABSTRACT  
In recent years, courts have risen in power across the world, and the 
Indian Supreme Court has rightly been pointed to as an example of this 
global trend. In many ways the Indian Court has become a court of good 
governance that sits in judgment over the rest of the Indian government. 
This Article argues that the Court has expanded its mandate as a result of 
the shortcomings (real, perceived, or feared) of India’s representative 
institutions. The Indian Supreme Court’s institutional structure has also 
aided its rise and helps explain why the Court has gained more influence 
than most other judiciaries. This Article examines the development of 
India’s basic structure doctrine and the Court’s broad right to life 
jurisprudence to explore how the Court has enlarged its role. It argues 
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that the Court justified these two doctrines with not only a wide reading of 
the Indian Constitution, but also an appeal to broad, almost metaphysical, 
principles of “civilization” or good governance. The Article finishes by 
examining parallel interventions in other parts of the world, which suggest 
India’s experience is part of, and helps explain the larger global 
phenomenon of, the rise of rule through good governance principles via 
courts. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Judicial review is a relatively recent development. Only after the 
United States Supreme Court’s 1803 decision in Marbury v. Madison1 was 
judicial review firmly adopted by any country, and outside the United 
States the concept was at first slow to catch on.2 It was not until the run up 
to World War II that judicial review became common. Since then, not only 
has the number of courts with the power to perform judicial review 
increased, but so, too, has the diversity of ways in which these courts use 
this power. These innovations have corresponded with a marked rise, 
especially recently, in the influence of courts around the world, from Latin 
America to South Africa and the European Union. Scholars, including Ran 
Hirschl, Charles Epp, Tom Ginsburg, Daniel Brinks, and Varun Gauri, 
have only begun to study this transformation of judicial power.3  
The Indian Supreme Court has rightly been pointed to as an example of 
this global trend of the strengthening judiciary. There are few issues of 
political life in India with which the higher judiciary is not in some way 
involved, often critically.4 The Supreme Court has come to sit as what 
amounts to a court of good governance over the rest of the government—
some say seriously realigning India’s constitutionally envisioned 
separation of powers. This Article examines how this transformation took 
place. It argues that the Court has expanded its role, often in ways it is ill-
equipped to handle, in an attempt to combat the perceived governance 
 
 
 1. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 2. In his famous description of the three branches of government, Montesquieu spoke of the 
necessity of an independent judicial branch to protect personal liberty. CHARLES DE SECONDAT, 
BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 151–52 (Prometheus Books 2002) (1748). However, 
the judiciary Montesquieu envisioned was not empowered with judicial review; rather, it simply 
enforced the law without the biases or conflicts of interest of the executive or legislative branches. Id. 
The Privy Council’s jurisprudence was an important precursor to judicial review in British colonies, 
including the United States and later India, but the Council acted more as an administrator of colonial 
rule (ensuring the colonies did not step too far from British law) than as a check on the true source of 
colonial power—the British Parliament. In 1903 Australia became only the second country to have 
judicial review. Its judicial review, though, was created through a combination of constitutional and 
legislative provisions, and was not explicitly guaranteed in the constitution itself. See AUSTL. CONST. 
art. 76; Judiciary Act, 1903, art. 30. The Australian Constitution also lacked a bill of rights. In 1920, 
Austria became the third country to adopt judicial review. Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz [B-VG] 
[Constitution] BGBl No. 1/1930, arts. 137–48. 
 3. See generally RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES 
OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2007); CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, 
ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998); TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL 
REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES (2003); VARUN GAURI & 
DANIEL BRINKS, COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE: JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD (2008). 
 4. Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The Rise of Judicial Sovereignty, 18 J. DEMOCRACY 70, 78 (2007). 
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shortcomings of India’s representative institutions. Specifically, this 
Article tracks the Court’s development of two new tools—the basic 
structure doctrine and its expanded right to life jurisprudence—to address 
these apparent failings of representative governance. To justify its new 
interventions, the Supreme Court has appealed not just to a broad 
interpretation of the Indian Constitution, but indeed to broader (almost 
transcendent) principles of “civilization” or good governance. The model 
of the good governance court and its rise in India suggests a useful prism 
through which to view the recent global expansion of judicial power, 
especially in developing countries.  
The Indian Supreme Court’s current broad role in Indian political life 
was not planned. In the Indian Constitution, the Court’s powers closely 
resemble those of the rather restricted U.S. Supreme Court. Given the lack 
of well-articulated alternative models of judicial review at independence, 
this similarity is not surprising. The original, narrow judicial role of the 
Court, however, sits in incongruity with the Constitution’s transformative 
vision for Indian society.  
In contrast to the American Constitution, which largely solidified the 
economic and social status quo even while bringing momentous political 
changes, India’s Constitution was born with an eye towards multiple 
transformations.5 The Indian Constitution not only solidified the gains won 
in the country’s struggles for independence against Britain, but also 
attempted to spark and shape social and economic revolutions within 
India, partly out of fear that the failure to do so would lead to political 
revolution.6 The Constitution stripped the nobility of its powers and 
created a framework to empower lower castes and tribal groups. It laid 
down Directive Principles, which, although not judicially enforceable, 
imposed a duty on the government to improve the welfare of its citizens 
 
 
 5. The Fourteenth Amendment belatedly added a more socially transformative role to the U.S. 
Constitution, but the courts did not actively press this vision until the 1950s. The U.S. Constitution 
makes no mention of government intervention for economic upliftment or redistribution. Indeed, at 
India’s independence the U.S. Supreme Court had only just accepted that the federal government even 
had the authority to create many of the pillars of the modern welfare state. 
 6. Dr. Ambedkar, Chairman of India’s Constitutional drafting committee, famously warned that 
when India’s Constitution came into effect,  
we are going to enter into a life of contradictions. In politics we will have equality and in 
social and economic life we will have inequality. . . . How long shall we continue to deny 
equality in our social and economic life? If we continue to deny it for long, we will do so only 
by putting our political democracy in peril. 
The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, Remarks at the Meeting of the Constient Assembly of India 
(Nov. 25, 1949), available at http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol11p11.htm. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss1/2
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through the broad powers of the modern administrative state.7 In essence, 
the Indian Constitution—like many constitutions that would follow it, 
particularly in the developing world8—attempted to create an ongoing, 
controlled revolution by laying an architecture in which massive social 
and economic transformation could take place within the limits of a liberal 
democracy. It is this vision of a controlled revolution that the Court has 
since reshaped itself to promote.  
The first section of this Article examines several criticisms of India’s 
Parliament—frustration with its incompetence, fear of its ability to subvert 
liberal democracy, and exhaustion at its seeming abdication of the 
responsibilities of governing—to provide a causal context to explain why 
and how the Supreme Court expanded its role. It argues that Parliament’s 
inability to successfully promote the Constitution’s broad vision of a 
controlled revolution has led the Supreme Court to take on a larger 
mandate. This section also briefly details some of the perceived 
deficiencies of India’s other representative institutions (executive- and 
state-level). It then highlights how the shortcomings of India’s 
representative institutions (real, perceived, or feared) have helped spawn 
various unelected bodies that attempt to bypass or check these perceived 
limitations.  
In the second section, this Article turns to the Supreme Court itself to 
add an institutional explanation for the Court’s rise in power. The Court’s 
institutional structure, which resembles that of South Asia’s other vibrant 
and expansive supreme courts, has been under-explored in previous 
writings about the Indian legal system. Its structure, though, has helped 
foster the Court’s broader good governance role and helps explain why it 
has been able to expand this role further than most courts elsewhere.  
This Article then focuses on two doctrines that played a decisive role in 
the Supreme Court’s transformation. The third section describes how, 
largely as a result of emergency rule under Indira Gandhi, the Court 
developed and solidified the basic structure doctrine during the 1970s and 
1980s. This doctrine holds that amendments to the Constitution cannot 
damage its basic structure, which the Court has found includes such tenets 
as its democratic and secular nature and certain fundamental rights.  
The fourth section of this Article turns to the 1980s and 1990s, during 
which time the Court expanded its interpretation of the right to life 
provision of the Constitution.9 It did so to help empower poorer sections of 
 
 
 7. INDIA CONST. arts. 36–51. 
 8. See infra Part VI.C. 
 9. INDIA CONST. art. 21. Note that the “right to life” in India means something quite different 
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society and to fill the governance vacuum left by an often ineffective and 
fractured Parliament. In this process, the Court developed public interest 
litigation (“PIL”) which had relaxed standing and procedural requirements 
as well as broad new remedies. This right to life jurisprudence eventually 
created a system of judicial or constitutional governance in which the 
higher courts took on many tasks traditionally associated with the 
country’s representative institutions.  
By striking down threatening constitutional amendments and 
promoting welfare interests with remarkable zeal, the Indian Supreme 
Court departed dramatically from its American judicial model. Although 
these doctrines seemingly represent different extremes of judicial 
intervention, sections three and four of this Article contend that they are 
both largely justified by the Court on two grounds. First, the Court 
successfully claimed that it could, and should, enforce the vision of a 
controlled revolution embodied in the Indian Constitution. Second, the 
Supreme Court appealed to wide, almost metaphysical, norms of 
“civilization” or good governance that should guide modern democratic 
governments. The third and fourth sections then examine accountability 
and capacity criticisms of the Court’s broadened role. Despite the 
sometimes uneasy coexistence between good governance and more 
classical democratic principles these criticisms highlight, the Court’s new 
doctrines have so far proved relatively stable and even gained the Court 
greater legitimacy.  
The fifth section of this Article puts the Court’s expanded right to life 
jurisprudence and basic structure doctrine into global perspective. Viewing 
parallels of these Indian doctrines in other countries through an American 
lens, they seem like outliers or discrepancies that with time will evolve 
towards the older American standard. Seen through an Indian judicial 
lens–from the standpoint of a judiciary that started in an American mold 
and evolved away from it—examples of similar judicial innovation 
become signs of a larger shift. This Article suggests that this shift may 
represent a broader global rise in rule through good governance principles 
via courts. It also proposes that the factors that propelled the evolution of 
the Court in India may help explain the strengthening of the judiciary 
elsewhere.  
Before beginning, two points of context that cannot be fully explored 
within the narrow agenda of this Article should be mentioned here to help 
 
 
from the “right to life” in contemporary American discourse. See infra Part V for an explanation of 
Indian jurisprudence on the subject. 
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properly situate the rise of the good governance judiciary in India (and 
elsewhere). First, the growth of the Supreme Court’s power parallels 
another current global trend that is also present in India: the rise of 
unelected bodies (from central banks to electricity commissions) that 
check or bypass the perceived shortcomings of representative 
institutions.10 Implicit in the justification of these unelected bodies is the 
idea that there exist certain principles of good governance that can 
successfully guide them. Direct input by representative bodies in their 
decisions is not necessary, and can even be detrimental. Seen in this light, 
the widening of the Indian Supreme Court’s powers is only one example 
within a broader rise of good governance rule through unelected bodies. 
Second, the Court’s (and other unelected bodies’) increasingly wide 
application of good governance principles harkens back to political 
traditions that, throughout history, have placed broad good governance 
obligations on rulers. The ability of rulers to meet these duties helped 
determine whether they were considered “good” kings or “just” 
emperors.11 With the evolution of modern democracy, citizens directly 
elected the government that they believed most furthered their vision of 
good governance. Rule by the will of the people through representative 
institutions was prioritized over, or understood to be synonymous with, 
good governance. The Indian judiciary may promote principles that it 
argues underlie modern democratic “civilization,” but in so doing it has 
often overridden or circumvented the country’s representative institutions. 
In taking these actions the Court has helped revitalize an older political 
normative tradition that emphasizes broad, idealized duties of good 
governance. These duties exist outside the sanction of a country’s 
representative institutions, and indeed outside that of any institutionalized 
 
 
 10. Unelected bodies have gained increasing control over many policies that affect peoples’ lives 
in the United States and Europe. FRANK VIBERT, THE RISE OF THE UNELECTED: DEMOCRACY AND THE 
NEW SEPARATION OF POWERS 4, 6 (2007). 
 11. Many traditions have placed duties on rulers. The basis for this may be religious; utilitarian; 
natural; or related to a sense of justice, honor, or reciprocity. Thomas Hobbes found that “it is . . . [the 
sovereigns’] duty to obey right reason in all things so far as they can; right reason is the natural, moral 
and divine law.” THOMAS HOBBES, ON THE CITIZEN 143 (Richard Tuck & Michael Silverthorne eds. 
& trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1647). See generally THE ORIGINAL ANALECTS: SAYINGS OF 
CONFUCIUS AND HIS SUCCESSORS (E. Bruce Brooks & A. Taeko Brooks eds. & trans., 1998); 
MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, THE OFFICES 106 (Thomas Cockman trans., London, J. M. Dent 1909) 
(1699). The dharmasastra and religious texts laid out the duties of good governance of early Hindu 
rulers. See generally THE LAWS OF MANU 128–96 (Wendy Doniger & Brian Smith trans., Penguin 
Group 1991) (1794) (describing the duties of a ruler); Mahendra P. Singh, Constitutionalization and 
Realization of Human Rights in India, in HUMAN RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
EMPOWERMENT 26, 38–40 (C. Raj Kumar & K. Chockalingam eds., 2007) (commenting that some 
Indians still embrace a dharma-centered view of the law).  
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sovereign. In appealing to principles more extensive than simply 
democracy, the good governance court opens a new space of intervention 
and legitimacy. This space is certainly not settled, yet neither is it still in 
its infancy, and we can begin to trace the democratic and political impact 
of these interventions.  
II. THE PEOPLE AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS 
To understand how and why the Supreme Court widened its reach in 
India, we must first turn to the country’s representative institutions. It is 
the power of these bodies that the judiciary traditionally monitors with its 
review authority. Which people these institutions represent and how these 
bodies attempt to address their problems have a defining effect on how 
courts operate in a country. This section will focus on India’s Parliament, 
as it is the most powerful and central of India’s representative institutions. 
A. India’s “Social Question” 
In the opening paragraphs to Democracy in America, Tocqueville 
wrote that he was struck by Americans’ “equality of condition” and how 
this equality (amongst those who voted), more than anything else, shaped 
the governance of the then young United States.12 In contrast, since 
independence, India’s situation has much more closely resembled that of 
eighteenth-century France than eighteenth-century America. India faced 
the same “social question” of millions of poor citizens needing economic 
upliftment that Hannah Arendt argued ultimately doomed the French 
Revolution.13 By almost continuously remaining a democracy since 
independence, India has defied the wisdom of thinkers, from Aristotle to 
Arendt, who argue that a stable democracy requires a large middle class 
electorate and little poverty.14 India’s poor have not doomed the country’s 
democracy, but they have dramatically shaped its representative 
institutions and judiciary.  
 
 
 12. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA VOL. ONE 3, 252–53 (Henry Reeve 
trans., Francis Bowen & Philip Bradley revised, A.A. Knopf 2008) (1840). Notably, Tocqueville 
glossed over slavery and many other inequalities of early America, but his point that amongst those 
Americans who were allowed to vote there was a high degree of, and often relatively equal, material 
wealth is still valid.  
 13. HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 59–114 (1965).  
 14. Id.; ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 170 (Benjamin Jowett trans., InteLex 2000) (cir. 350 B.C.). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss1/2
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Poverty in India is widespread and deep. The Indian government 
developed its current standard for measuring poverty in the early 1970s.15 
At that time, nearly 55% of the population was considered below the 
national poverty line.16 In 1999–2000 this figure was down to nearly 
26%.17 However, these current numbers do not provide an accurate 
picture, given the relatively low level at which the government has set the 
poverty line. According to the World Bank, in 1999–2000, nearly 35% of 
Indians lived on less than one dollar a day, and almost 80% of Indians 
lived on less than two dollars a day.18 The first government census in 1951 
found that just 18% of the population was literate.19 Though the literacy 
rate has grown steadily since then, it still officially stood at only about 
65% in 2001.20 
Despite its poverty, India generally has a high voter turnout, averaging 
around 60% in general elections.21 Indeed, turnout seems to be higher 
amongst poorer and less educated groups in India.22 This fact can be seen 
in the rural-urban divide in voting patterns, as urban areas on average have 
more educated and wealthier populations. In the 2004 general election, 
voter turnout was over 58% nationwide.23 For Delhi it was 47%.24 The 
other five largest metro areas averaged a voter turnout rate 11.84% lower 
than the average for their state.25 
 
 
 15. PAUL BRASS, THE POLITICS OF INDIA SINCE INDEPENDENCE 292 (2006). 
 16. MINISTRY OF FINANCE, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, UNION BUDGET & ECONOMIC SURVEY 
2001–2002, POVERTY tbl. 10.4 (2002), available at http://indiabudget.nic.in/es2001-02/chapt2002/ 
chap102.pdf. 
 17. Id. 
 18. WORLD BANK, 2006 WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS, tbl. 2.7 (2006), available at 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006/contents/table2_7.htm. 
 19. MINISTRY OF FIN., GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, UNION BUDGET & ECONOMIC SURVEY 2001–
2002, LITERACY AS SEEN IN THE 2001 CENSUS tbl. 10.1 (2002), available at http://indiabudget. 
nic.in/es2001-02/chapt2002/chap106.pdf. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Jean Drèze, Democracy and the Right to Food, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT, 
supra note 11, at 45, 51. 
 22. Ashutosh Varshney, Is India Becoming More Democratic?, 59 J. ASIAN STUD. 3, 20 (2000). 
 23. ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA, STATISTICAL REPORT ON GENERAL ELECTIONS, 2004 TO 
THE 14TH LOK SABHA, Vol. I, 10 (2004), available at http://www.eci.gov.in/SR_KeyHighLights/ 
LS_2004/Vol_I_LS_2004.pdf. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Overall the average voter turnout in the 2004 General Elections for the six largest 
metropolitan areas was 52.7%, compared to the overall Indian voter turnout rate of 58.07%. To 
compute the difference in turnout rate between the five largest metropolitan areas besides Delhi and 
their respective states, Election Commission statistics were averaged for the districts of each area and 
then compared to the state’s voter turnout rate. The state data and averages for the metropolitan areas 
are, respectively: Maharashtra 54.38% and Mumbai 47.16%, resulting in a difference of 7.22%; West 
Bengal 78.04% and Calcutta 66.79%, resulting in a difference of 11.25%; Tamil Nadu 60.81% and 
Madras 47.6%, resulting in a difference of 13.21%; Karnataka 65.14% and Bangalore 51.84%, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Many of India’s elite (and ordinary citizens) question the quality of the 
parliament elected by India’s poor and uneducated “teeming millions,” as 
one member of the constitutional assembly described the majority of 
Indians.26 This argument has two primary variants. First, there is a belief 
that a parliament elected by the masses will be corrupt and ineffective at 
furthering the interests of the poor people who elect it and the country as a 
whole.27 Because so many voters are destitute, they do not have the 
education or resources to determine what political platform would best 
represent their needs.28 They are, therefore, easily “misled” by caste, 
communal, or patronage politics, all of which are rife in India. Further, 
even if the public did know what policies are best, it simply does not have 
the resources to effectively monitor politicians or otherwise engage with 
the political system to keep abuses in check and its desires prioritized.29 
Second, there is a fear that Indians will elect a parliament that promises 
to quickly right the nation’s social injustices through mass redistribution 
of property. Such a platform could lead to violence, an undermining of 
liberal democracy, and even the breakup of the country.  
B. Overridden Constitutional Constraints 
Although the Constitution was designed to check the more radical 
tendencies of Parliament and help calm fears created by having an 
economically poor electorate, Parliament has traditionally treated 
amending the Constitution like legislating by other means. The 
 
 
resulting in a difference of 13.3%; Andhra Pradesh 69.95% and Hyderabad 55.73%, resulting in a 
difference of 14.22%. The rural-urban divide is even greater than the difference between turnout rates 
in the metropolitan area and its respective states indicates, since the metropolitan area is also included 
in the average voter turnout rate for the state. This data is based on information found id. at 10 and in 
ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA, STATISTICAL REPORT ON GENERAL ELECTIONS, 2004 TO THE 14TH 
LOK SABHA, VOL. II, 36, 164–65, 233–38, 344–46, 485–87 (2004), available at http://www.eci.gov.in/ 
StatisticalReports/LS_2004/Vol_II_LS_2004.pdf. 
 26. Mr. B. Das, Remarks at the Constituent Assembly of India Debates (Aug. 30, 1947), 
available at http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol5p11a.htm. 
 27. See Drèze, supra note 21, at 51.  
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. “Because underprivileged sections of the population are excluded from active 
participation in democratic politics, their aspirations and priorities are not reflected in public policy.” 
Id. See Varshney, supra note 22, at 13–14 for a brief overview of the literature on “Authoritarian 
Democracy” (the idea that the poor’s socio-economic position means they will likely be controlled by 
economic elites in a democracy). See also Mukulika Banerjee, Sacred Elections, 42 ECON. & POL. 
WKLY. 1556 (Apr. 28, 2004) (discussing patronage politics and ritualistic traditions in Indian 
elections); ARUN SHOURIE, THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM 220–24 (2007) (discussing how the 
common man was easily misled and explaining that it was rational for him to remain ignorant of his 
political situation). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss1/2
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Constitution has had ninety-four amendments between 1950 and 2007, 
averaging 1.65 amendments per year.30 There were only seventeen years 
during this fifty-seven-year period when no amendments were added to 
the Constitution,31 and the pace and volume of amending has only 
increased since independence.32  
Part of the reason why there have been so many amendments is that the 
Indian Constitution, more than most, details the administration of 
governance.33 This feature has its roots in the political elite’s underlying 
distrust of a popularly elected Parliament, which goes all the way back to 
India’s founding.34 Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, a leading Dalit politician and 
chairman of the Constitutional Drafting Committee, was famous for 
criticizing the Congress Party leadership for being Brahmin-dominated 
and contemptful of the common man.35 Yet, when introducing the draft 
Constitution to the Constituent Assembly, even he reasoned that 
“[d]emocracy in India is only a top-dressing on an Indian soil, which is 
essentially undemocratic. In these circumstances it is wiser not to trust the 
Legislature to prescribe forms of administration. This is the justification 
for incorporating them in the Constitution.”36 If in Tocqueville’s America 
the people were the word of God, in India there was far more skepticism 
of their wisdom. 
Perhaps amending the Constitution would have been made more 
difficult (most amendments only require a two-thirds vote of Parliament) 
if the Constituent Assembly felt it had more representational legitimacy. 
The Assembly was elected indirectly by the state legislative assemblies, 
which themselves were elected under the Government of India Act,37 a 
1935 British statute that did not provide for universal suffrage.38 Some 
 
 
 30. The first decade of the Constitution’s history saw the fewest number of amendments (seven) 
with amendments being added with the lowest frequency (amendments were added in only four years 
of the 1950s). This data is compiled from a list of India’s Constitutional amendments from 
independence until 2007. The Constitution (Amendment) Acts, available at http://indiacode.nic.in/ 
coiweb/coifiles/amendment.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2008).  
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See B.R. AMBEDKAR, THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF B.R. AMBEDKAR 473–94 (Valerian 
Rodrigues ed., 2002). 
 34. Id. at 485. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. The Government of India Act, 1935, 26 Geo. 5 & 1 Edw. 8, c.2 (Eng.). 
 38. H. McD. Clokie, The New Constitution for India, 30 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1152, 1158–61 
(1936); Sunil Khilnani, The Indian Constitution and Democracy, in INDIA’S LIVING CONSTITUTION: 
IDEAS, PRACTICES, CONTROVERSIES 64, 71 (Zoya Hasan, E. Sridharan & R. Sudarshan eds., 2002) 
(highlighting the representation deficit in the Constituent Assembly).  
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Assembly members questioned their ability to bind what would be a 
parliament elected more directly by the people.39 Dr. Ambedkar accepted 
that the Assembly was not as representative of the people, but pointed out 
that the Indian Constitution was easier to amend than that of other 
countries.40 Tellingly, he also justified the Assembly’s constituent power 
by arguing that any future parliament elected on the basis of adult suffrage 
would be likely to have less wisdom than the Constituent Assembly.41  
C. Poor Parliamentary Governance 
Not only are many Indians afraid of the specter of an unchecked 
Parliament, but they also view the institution as often abandoning its 
governance functions. Even Members of Parliament (“MPs”) agree with 
this view and state that as a result the public trusts the higher judiciary 
more than Parliament to govern.42  
It is difficult and dangerous to try empirically to show how well the 
Indian Parliament has governed, but the perception of incompetence and 
simple abdication of responsibility is widespread. There are also some 
telling statistics. In 2006, for instance, almost sixty-five percent of MPs 
said nothing in the Lok Sabha (Parliament’s lower house) on a legislative 
issue, while forty percent of bills received less than one hour of debate.43  
To be fair, anti-defection laws in India mean that MPs cannot deviate 
from their party in votes on legislation, giving them a disincentive to 
engage in legislative issues.44 Further, because there are 552 members of 
 
 
 39. See Khilnani, supra note 38, at 71–72. 
 40. Ambedkar, supra note 33, at 493. 
 41. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, Remarks at the Meeting of the Constituent Assembly of India Vol. IX 
(Sept. 17, 1949), available at http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol9p37c.htm (“I am quite 
frank enough to say that this House, such as it is, has probably a greater modicum and quantum of 
knowledge and information than the future Parliament is likely to have.”). Id. 
 42. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Judicial Activism Is Like an Unruly Horse, INDIAN EXPRESS, May 
4, 2007, available at http://www.indianexpress.com/story/29975.html. As Jayanth Krishnan has 
pointed out, there has never been a survey of the public’s perception of the upper judiciary. Therefore, 
although academics, members of the bar, English language newspapers, and elites may claim that the 
upper judiciary is more trusted than Parliament or the executive, it is unclear if this perception is 
shared by the larger Indian public. Jayanth K. Krishnan, Scholarly Discourse, Public Perceptions, and 
the Cementing of Norms: The Case of the Indian Supreme Court and a Plea for Research, 9(2) J. APP. 
PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 15 (forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1003811 (last 
visited Sept. 17, 2008). 
 43. SOCIAL WATCH INDIA, CITIZENS’ REPORT ON GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 2007, 30–
31 (2007). 
 44. C.V. Madhukar, House This for Debate?, INDIAN EXPRESS, Jan. 3, 2007, available at 
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/house-this-for-debate/19938/. 
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the Lok Sabha,45 it is difficult to find time for every representative to 
speak on each bill. Additionally, an MP’s staff budget is currently barely 
enough for a single secretary to help with research on bills.46 However, 
that sixty-five percent of Members of Parliament had nothing to say47 does 
seem to indicate a high level of apathy on legislative issues amongst many 
MPs.  
Parliament sessions are also filled with frequent political posturing that 
disrupts the legislative process. From the fall of 2004 to the fall of 2006, 
only approximately twenty percent of “in session” time was spent on 
actually debating legislation.48 At the end of the budget session in the 
spring of 2007, an exasperated Prime Minister Singh chastised 
Parliamentarians “to reflect and [think] whether [the frequent disruptions] 
enhance[] the standing of Parliament in the eyes of the people . . . .”49  
Adding to these difficulties, India has one of the highest population-to-
representative ratios in the world. Each member of the up to 552 member 
strong Lok Sabha represents on average two million people (the upper 
house, or Rajya Sabha, is limited to 250 members, most of whom are 
elected by state and territorial legislatures, although twelve are appointed 
by the President).50 With such large constituencies, it is difficult and time-
consuming for a Member of Parliament to attend to all the demands of the 
citizens he or she represents.  
In one of the more frequently cited examples of perceived 
parliamentarian neglect, the Supreme Court laid down guidelines in 1997 
to protect women against sexual harassment in the workplace because 
none had ever been enacted by Parliament.51 The Court found that having 
no law violated women’s fundamental rights and wrote its own guidelines 
for the country with inspiration from the Convention on the Elimination of 
 
 
 45. See Lok Sabha, http://loksabha.gov.in/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2008) (stating that under the 
Constitution the Lok Sabha may have up to 530 members representing the states, twenty members 
representing the Union Territories, and two nominated members representing the Anglo-Indian 
community).  
 46. See Lok Sabha, Amenities for Members of Parliament, http://164.100.24.209/newls/ 
membersbook/AMENITIES.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2008); Madhukar, supra note 44. 
 47. Supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 48. Madhukar, supra note 44. 
 49. Sandeep Dikshit, Parties Should Address Contentious Issues Through Dialogue, THE HINDU, 
May 18, 2007, available at http://www.hindu.com/2007/05/18/stories/2007051816861400.htm. 
 50. See Lok Sabha, supra note 45. The population of India in 2008 was estimated to be 
approximately 1.15 billion people. See India, The CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2008). When the population of 
India is divided by the number of Lok Sabha members the population-to-representative ratio comes out 
to about two million to one. 
 51. Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 3 Supp. S.C.R. 404, 414–17.  
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All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”), which India 
had ratified.52 Although the Court said the guidelines it crafted could be 
overridden by legislation, Parliament has passed no legislation to do so in 
the more than ten years since.  
India’s Parliament has a reputation for not only underperformance, but 
also corruption and even criminality. In December 2005, a television 
station ensnared eleven MPs in a sting operation in which it paid them 
money to ask questions in Parliament on the behalf of a fictitious body.53 
In 2008, before a major trust vote, opposition members waved money 
inside the Lok Sabha, claiming that they had been offered bribes to abstain 
during the vote.54 Criminals have even begun to become politicians 
themselves. In 2006, the National Social Watch Coalition reported that 
criminal cases were pending against almost twenty-five percent of 
members of the Lok Sabha.55 Half of these were for charges that could 
carry a sentence of five or more years in prison.56 
All of these factors contribute to large sections of the public seeing 
Parliament as having largely abdicated its governing responsibilities. In 
this climate, the Supreme Court has been able to more easily assert that it 
has the power and duty to take on many of Parliament’s responsibilities. 
D. A Fractured Parliament  
Parliament’s highly splintered composition has further aided the 
Court’s rise. No political party—even Congress during its years of 
dominance—has ever received more than fifty percent of the popular vote 
in India.57 Districts are won on the basis of who receives the most votes, 
and a majority is not required.58 In the current Lok Sabha, sixty percent of 
members did not gather more than fifty percent of the votes in their 
district.59 Such an electoral set-up helps fuel the numerous regional-, 
 
 
 52. Id. at 412. 
 53. When the story broke to great public outcry (although perhaps not surprise), Parliament 
expelled these members. The bribes ranged from only a bit over $300 to around $1200. SOCIAL 
WATCH INDIA, supra note 43, at 42–43. 
 54. India Media Condemn Vote ‘Taint,’ BBC.com, July 23, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
south_asia/7520726.stm.  
 55. Amelia Gentleman, A Cancerous Growth in India’s Body Politic, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 
26, 2007, at 2, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/04/26/news/letter.php. 
 56. Id. 
 57. The results of each parliamentary election can be found on the Election Commission of 
India’s website, Election Commission of India, http://www.eci.gov.in/StatisticalReports/Election 
Statistics.asp (last visited Nov. 15, 2008). 
 58. SHOURIE, supra note 29, at 21–28. 
 59. Id. at 28. 
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caste-, and tribal-based parties that permeate and fracture Indian politics as 
they compete for only the forty, or even thirty, percent of the vote they 
need to win.60 It also means that even parties that have won well over half 
of Parliament’s seats have not necessarily been given a mandate from over 
half of India’s population.  
Despite never winning more than half of the national popular vote, the 
Congress Party was the dominant party in the decades after independence. 
Until 1967, it not only had a majority of seats in the Lok Sabha, but also 
had over the two-thirds seats required to amend the Constitution (a super-
majority it would later reclaim in the elections of 1971, 1980, and 1984).61 
Yet since 1989 there have been only coalition governments, with no party 
winning a majority of seats on its own.62 The current Manmohan Singh-led 
government is comprised of an uneasy alliance of fourteen coalition 
parties. 
E. Executive- and State-Level Governance  
The executive, whose ministers are composed of different members of 
the ruling coalition, has also been susceptible to the problems that plague 
Parliament more generally. The executive often becomes preoccupied with 
keeping political alliances together in the center, or even with simply 
trying to keep the country together. In 2006, the Ministry of Home Affairs 
reported active, armed resistance against the government in nineteen of 
twenty-eight states.63 The executive’s focus on attempting to control or 
appease fractured political alliances while combating violent threats to the 
state has left it with less time to focus on the nuts and bolts of governing. 
Moreover, several ministers have been involved in high-profile corruption 
and criminal scandals.64  
State-level representative institutions are also plagued by many of the 
same problems found at the center. These shortcomings have prodded the 
higher judiciary to expand its public interest litigation jurisprudence to 
take on a broader role in areas traditionally overseen by state government. 
 
 
 60. BRASS, supra note 15, at 18–19, 34. 
 61. Id. tbl. 3.2. 
 62. See SHOURIE, supra note 29, at 56. 
 63. See GOV’T OF INDIA MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS, ANNUAL REPORT 2006–2007, annexes II, 
III, IV, available at http://www.mha.nic.in/ (follow “Annual Report” hyperlink; then follow “Annual 
Report 2006–2007” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 17, 2008). 
 64. See, e.g., Nirnimesh Kumar, Shibu Soren Sentenced to Life, THE HINDU, Dec. 6, 2006, 
available at http://www.hindu.com/2006/12/06/stories/2006120604630100.htm; Fernandes: Popular 
but Controversial Minister, BBC.COM, Mar. 15, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/ 
1223625.stm.  
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From independence until 1967, the Congress Party largely ruled the states 
without serious political challenge, and its internal power structure helped 
smooth center-state relations.65 Since 1967, however, and particularly after 
Congress’s massive defeat at the center in 1977, there has been widespread 
fracturing of political power at the state level, leading to governing and 
legitimacy problems similar to those found in the center.66 Differences in 
ruling parties at the state and center have often led to strained relations. 
Further, corruption and capacity challenges are often worse at the state 
level. For example, in Uttar Pradesh about forty percent of the legislative 
assembly faced criminal charges in 2008.67  
F. The Corresponding Rise of the Court 
The Emergency in the 1970s, as we will see, undercut the political 
legitimacy of Parliament and the executive, as well as their claims to 
constitutional supremacy. It is their poor governance record, though, along 
with the fracturing of the electorate, that has continued to weaken and 
distract India’s representative institutions. Since the Indian military, 
although highly respected, has traditionally been under strong civilian 
control,68 and the President is largely a figurehead, the Supreme Court, as 
one of the few truly unified national institutions, has been able to increase 
its governance role relatively unchallenged.69 In this climate of both fear 
of Parliament’s power and exhaustion at its perceived misgovernance, the 
Supreme Court has reshaped the American judicial model it inherited into 
one that, it has argued, is better suited for India’s social and political 
situation. As Chief Justice Balakrishnan stated in 2008: 
It is often argued that the Supreme Court should maintain restraint 
and should not violate the legitimate limits in the exercise of its 
powers. However, this argument fails to recognize the constant 
failures of governance taking place at the hands of the other organs 
 
 
 65. T.V. Sathyamurthy, Impact of Centre-State Relations on Indian Politics: An Interpretative 
Reckoning 1947–1987, in STATE AND POLITICS IN INDIA 232, 241 (Partha Chatterjee ed., 1997). 
 66. Id. at 250. 
 67. Piyush Srivastava, Only 160 UP MLAs Face Criminal Cases, MAIL TODAY (INDIA), June 28, 
2008. 
 68. BRASS, supra note 15, at 62. 
 69. India’s nationalist leaders highly valued the idea of an independent judiciary. This historical 
tradition may also partially explain why the judiciary’s expansion of its own power was not more 
seriously challenged by the other branches or the public. See Gerald E. Beller, Benevolent Illusions in 
a Developing Society: The Assertion of Supreme Court Authority in Democratic India, 36 W. POL. Q. 
513, 515 (1983).  
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of State, and that it is the function of the Court to check, balance 
and correct any failure arising out of any other State organ.70 
G. The Growth of Unelected Bodies 
The rise of the Supreme Court is part of a larger trend present in India 
and across the globe that takes decision-making power away from 
representative institutions and transfers it to independent or quasi-
independent unelected bodies. Bruce Ackerman and Edward Rubin have 
pointed to the rise of these institutions more generally as a reason why we 
should discard our traditional conception of three branches of 
government.71 The rise of such bodies in India was likely aided by a 
Supreme Court that has not found a strict separation of powers in the 
Indian Constitution.72 The prominence of these unelected institutions may 
herald the rise of a post-democratic era in which the expanding power of 
unelected bodies and their legal and technocratic restrictions render 
democratic engagement largely impotent to effect fundamental political 
change. Democracy is left in name, but only as a shell that gives 
legitimacy to unelected institutions and unassailable laws and principles 
that guide the polity. 
From the beginning, India’s founders were concerned that the politics, 
conflicts of interest, and corruption of the country’s representative 
institutions could seriously hamper the young nation. To alleviate some of 
these fears, the Constitution set up a series of independent unelected 
bodies. These constitutionally-mandated bodies included a commission to 
supervise elections,73 a comptroller and auditor general to check the 
government’s accounts for legal irregularities,74 a finance commission to 
apolitically allocate tax revenue between the center and the states,75 and 
public service commissions at the union and state levels to oversee 
 
 
 70. Shri K.G. Balakrishnan, Chief Justice of India, Address at Kerala Legislative Assembly, 
Golden Jubilee Celebrations 2007–08, Seminar on “Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary” (Apr. 26, 
2008). 
 71. See generally Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633 
(2000); EDWARD RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE MODERN 
STATE (2005).  
 72. Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab, (1955) 2 S.C.R. 225, 235 (“The Indian 
Constitution has not indeed recognised the doctrine of separation of powers in its absolute rigidity 
. . . .”). 
 73. INDIA CONST. art. 324. 
 74. Id. art. 148. 
 75. Id. art. 280. 
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recruitment and promotion to government posts.76 The relatively 
independent Reserve Bank of India, which was created by the British in 
1934, continued to regulate the money supply after independence and, 
after 1994, took on expanded powers to regulate the country’s financial 
sector.77 
More recently, after its decision to liberalize the economy in the early 
1990s, Parliament created a new set of independent or quasi-independent 
regulatory bodies. These entities include the Security and Exchange Board 
of India,78 the Telecom Regulatory Authority,79 the Insurance Regulatory 
and Development Authority,80 the Competition Commission,81 and central 
and state electricity authorities.82 The development of these bodies 
signaled a shift away from not only direct Parliamentary control over the 
economy through nationalized industries, but also Parliament’s control 
over its regulation. In creating these institutions, Parliament was deeply 
influenced by advice from international development agencies (which 
themselves are another set of unelected bodies with a significant ability to 
control and shape governance decisions). It was hoped that if these Indian 
regulatory authorities had independence from the political process they 
would be less likely to grant “market-distorting” subsidies or be captured 
for political purposes, while reducing corruption and providing better 
services.83 In reality, these agencies are often not as independent as they 
are made out to be. Their actions are generally reviewed by Parliament, 
many of them can be reconfigured or outright disbanded through further 
legislation, and they must respond to many of the same political pressures 
as Parliament in order to retain their legitimacy with the public. 
However, the formation of these independent and quasi-independent 
bodies, both at India’s independence and since, resulted from the 
 
 
 76. Id. art. 315. 
 77. Reserve Bank of India, About Us, http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/AboutusDisplay.aspx (last 
visited Sept. 17, 2008). 
 78. The Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, No. 15 of 1992, available at http://india 
code.nic.in/ (search Act Year “1992”).  
 79. The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, No. 24 of 1997, available at http://india 
code.nic.in/ (search Act Year “1997”). 
 80. Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority Act, No. 41 of 1999, available at 
http://indiacode.nic.in/ (search Act Year “1999”). 
 81. The Competition Act, No. 12 of 2003, available at http://indiacode.nic.in/ (search Short Title 
“Competition Act”). 
 82. The Electricity (Amendment) Act, No. 57 of 2003, available at http://indiacode.nic.in/ 
(search Short Title “Electricity”). 
 83. Navroz K. Dubash, Can Global Administrative Law Shape Local Political Opportunity 
Structures? A Study of Indian Electricity Regulators, Presented at Workshop on Global Regulatory 
Governance, Organized by Ctr. for Policy Research, New York Univ., New Delhi (Jan. 5–6, 2008). 
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perceived limits in the decision-making and governing abilities of 
representative institutions. Their mere creation is an affirmation of the idea 
that there are certain good governance principles by which these bodies 
can be guided—that a trained economist at a reserve bank has standards 
for determining when to expand the monetary supply, that an electoral 
commissioner has the ability to judge a fair election, that an electricity 
regulator can determine how quickly to allow electricity rates to rise, and 
that these decisions are not made better with direct representational input. 
Indeed, the development of these bodies seems to support the argument 
that there are large areas of governance over which there is little, or should 
be little, democratic debate. These areas are better off being governed by 
selective bodies directed by good governance principles than by 
representational institutions.  
The Supreme Court is different from these other unelected bodies. It 
has a far broader Constitutional mandate, it has review functions over 
many of the non-representative institutions, and it occupies a more 
illustrious place in the Indian popular imagination. The Supreme Court’s 
growing powers, though, should be seen in this context. What we are 
witnessing is not a simple struggle between the judiciary and 
representative bodies. Rather, it is a reconfiguration of decision-making 
authority more generally, as various unelected bodies use good governance 
principles to take on a more central role in governing.  
III. THE BACKSTOP SUPREME COURT 
It is not just the perceived limitations of the ability of India’s 
representative institutions to govern that have allowed the Supreme Court 
to take on its broader good governance function. The Court’s distinctive 
institutional design has also made it well-equipped to expand its powers in 
light of these institutions’ apparent shortcomings.  
The Indian judiciary is described by such scholars as Pratap Bhanu 
Mehta, Marc Galanter, and Jayanth Krishnan as a two-tier system.84 The 
High Courts and Supreme Court, which comprise the upper judiciary, are 
seen as relatively competent and trustworthy.85 Meanwhile, the lower 
judiciary, which is made up of district, session, family, rent, and other 
 
 
 84. Pratap Bhanu Mehta, India’s Judiciary: The Promise of Uncertainty, in PUBLIC 
INSTITUTIONS IN INDIA: PERFORMANCE AND DESIGN 158 (Devesh Kapur & Pratap Bhanu Mehta, eds., 
2005); Marc Galanter & Jayanth Krishnan, Bread for the Poor: Access to Justice and the Rights of the 
Needy in India, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 789, 789 (2004). 
 85. Id. 
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courts, is viewed as highly corrupt, plagued by seemingly insurmountable 
backlogs, and much less skilled.86 This characterization may underplay the 
more positive traits of the lower judiciary, such as its responsiveness to 
on-the-ground realities, and overplay the upper judiciary’s competence or 
trustworthiness. It is a description, though, that has been embraced by 
many—arguably including the upper judiciary itself.  
The Constitution conferred wide jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to 
rectify any miscarriage of justice in the lower courts.87 The Court was 
originally manned by eight justices, who were required to sit on at least a 
five-justice bench to hear constitutional matters, but could sit on smaller 
benches to hear other appeals.88 To attempt to address the perceived 
shortcomings of the lower courts, the upper judiciary has generally made 
appeal very easy. This ease of appeal, in combination with poor case 
management, delay in appointing new justices, and procedural 
inefficiencies in the upper judiciary, has led to chronic case overload in the 
Supreme Court, beginning shortly after independence and lasting to the 
present day.89 To remedy this problem, a series of constitutional 
amendments added fourteen more justices to the Court between the 1950s 
and 1980s.90  
Today, the Supreme Court has a sanctioned strength of twenty-six 
justices.91 For the most part, the justices sit in ten to twelve courtrooms 
and hear cases in benches of two, except the Chief Justice whose bench is 
comprised of three. A larger bench is assembled when the Court hears a 
constitutional matter.92 In a typical week, two-justice benches will hear 
arguments on Mondays and Fridays regarding whether pending cases 
should be admitted and placed on the calendar for a full hearing.93 A single 
 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-FIFTH REPORT ON THE SUPREME 
COURT—A FRESH LOOK 7 (1988), available at http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/101-169/Report 
125.pdf. 
 88. INDIA CONST. art. 145, § 3.  
 89. LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, supra note 87, at 7. 
 90. Other solutions, such as the creation of separate constitutional and appellate benches, were 
suggested but ultimately not implemented. Id. at 5. 
 91. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: A HANDBOOK OF INFORMATION 17 
(2005), available at http://www.supremecourtofindia.nic.in/HBPAPSCOI/index.html. 
 92. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA ANNUAL REPORT 2005–2006 64–65 
(2006), available at http://www.supremecourtofindia.nic.in/sciannualreport/annualreport2005-2006/ 
sciannualreport2005-2006.htm [hereinafter SUPREME COURT OF INDIA ANNUAL REPORT]. 
 93. Id. at 55. Oral argument for submissions continues in part out of a populist sense that all 
should be able to be heard before the highest court in the country, in part because justices do not trust 
lawyers to submit complete and well-crafted written briefs, and in part because the political power of 
the bar helps ensure that lawyers get as many billable appearances in front of the Court as possible.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss1/2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009] EXPANDING JUDICIARIES 21 
 
 
 
 
bench will go through dozens of cases on a Monday or Friday. According 
to statistics for between 2005 and 2007, about twelve percent of these 
cases are admitted as regular matters to be heard between Tuesday and 
Thursday.94 The rest are dismissed, often with only minimal oral 
argument. Better case management has meant that the Court has recently 
increased the number of cases it processes in a year.95 The Court disposed 
of 46,210 pending matters in 2005, an increase of thirty percent from five 
years earlier.96 
The increase in the number of the Court’s benches may have originally 
been intended to oversee a less-trusted lower judiciary. This increase, 
though, allowed the Court to hear the wide array of public interest 
litigation cases it would take on beginning in the 1980s. The expansion of 
judicial interventionism in matters traditionally associated with legislative 
and executive competence would, ironically, be sped up by the 
institutional design of the Supreme Court, which was meant to combat the 
(lower) judiciary’s own failures.  
With its multitude of benches sitting on a daily basis, the Court acts 
almost as a secondary government, issuing orders in cases that affect 
almost every aspect of Indian public life. The Court has ordered that taxis 
and buses be switched to natural gas in Delhi, regulated encroachment on 
and preservation of public forests, and implemented guidelines for school 
bus safety, along with many other details of governance.97 The High 
Courts take on governance functions similar to those of the Supreme Court 
in their respective jurisdictions, thereby multiplying the higher judiciary’s 
reach (in March 2007, there were 604 judges in the nation’s nineteen High 
Courts).98 
 
 
 94. This twelve percent figure is arrived at by dividing the number of regular hearing matters 
instituted during 2005–2007 by the number of admission matters disposed of during that period. The 
data is taken from Supreme Court of India, Year-wise, Subject Category-wise Disposal of Admission 
Matters During 2005–2007, and Year-wise, Subject Category-wise Institution of Regular Hearing 
Matters During 2005–2007 (on file with author). 
 95. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, supra note 92, at 57. 
 96. Id. Recently, this increase in efficiency has been offset by an increase in the number of cases 
filed before the Court each year. Id. 
 97. Amin Rosencranz & Michael Jackson, The Delhi Pollution Case: The Supreme Court of 
India and the Limits of Judicial Power, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 223, 233 (2003); T.N. Godavarman 
Thirumulpad v. Union of India, (2006) 1 S.C.C. 1; Joy Purkayastha, SC Guidelines Are Given the Go-
by, INDIAN EXPRESS, Apr. 21, 1998, available at http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/ie/daily/ 
19980421/11151174.html. 
 98. Press Release, Rajya Sabha, Press Info. Bureau, Gov’t of India, State Government and High 
Court Urged to Fill up Vacant Posts of Judges (Mar. 12, 2007), available at http://pib.nic.in/release/ 
release.asp?relid=25801. Some High Courts frequently have public interest litigation brought before 
them (such as New Delhi or Mumbai), while others are less frequently petitioned (such as Assam).  
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To give a sense of the pervasiveness of the Supreme Court’s role in 
Indian public life, it is helpful to compare how the legislature, executive, 
and Supreme Court are covered in the Indian press. In every year from 
2003 to 2007, more articles in The Hindu (a leading Indian newspaper) 
mentioned the Supreme Court than either Parliament or Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh. A search of The Hindu online includes all of its metro 
editions. As a result, the words “High Court” retrieve more hits than even 
the Supreme Court, showing the high profile of the upper judiciary in 
Indian political life more generally.  
In contrast, a search of the New York Times during this same time 
period reveals more articles mentioning Congress or President Bush than 
the Supreme Court by at least a two-to-one or three-to-one margin, 
respectively. The U.S. circuit courts are relatively rarely mentioned in 
comparison.99 It is likely that a survey of other English dailies in India 
would achieve similar results. A survey of Hindi and other local language 
 
 
 99. Number of articles that contain select government institution keywords in The Hindu and 
New York Times between 2003 and 2006: 
TABLE 1: THE HINDU SEARCH RESULTS 
 Supreme Court Parliament/ 
Congress 
Manmohan 
Singh/Bush 
High Court/ 
Circuit Court 
2007 4960 4220 3810 6500 
2006 4300 3980 3970 5880 
2005 3070 2750 2600 4830 
2004 2630 2440 1460 3680 
2003 634 493 29 860 
 
TABLE 2: NEW YORK TIMES SEARCH RESULTS 
 Supreme Court Parliament/ 
Congress 
Manmohan 
Singh/Bush 
High Court/ 
Circuit Court 
2007 2130 5620 7640 97 
2006 2960 6570 10500 116 
2005 3900 6150 10900 153 
2004 2420 4810 12700 98 
2003 1800 4010 8840 111 
 
This data was gathered on March 7, 2008, by searching for the terms “supreme court,” “parliament,” 
“Manmohan Singh,” and “high court” at news.google.com for each respective year of The Hindu, and 
the words “supreme court,” “congress,” “Bush,” and “circuit court” for each respective year of the 
New York Times. There are pitfalls to this methodology. Searches for “supreme court” pick up hits not 
only of the Indian Supreme Court in The Hindu, but also foreign supreme courts that are reported in 
the paper. A similar problem arises in the United States, with the additional problem that news stories 
on U.S. state supreme courts are also caught in such a search of the New York Times. The number of 
hits for “parliament” in The Hindu also includes articles written about foreign parliaments. Despite 
these and other methodological problems, this survey paints a broad picture about reporting on the 
judiciary versus the other branches of government in India and the United States. 
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papers, read predominantly by poorer sections of society, would probably 
not report on the higher judiciary with as great a frequency as the English 
dailies. Still, there would likely be proportionally many more articles 
about the upper judiciary than in the U.S. media.  
The perception that the Supreme Court is frequently more active in 
India’s daily governance than Parliament is also buttressed by the Court’s 
calendar. The Indian Supreme Court heard arguments on 190 days in 
2007.100 This number does not include the days a vacation bench sits while 
the full Court is away from mid-May to early July.101 As a comparison, the 
U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments on only thirty-eight days in its 2006-
2007 term.102 In contrast to the Indian Supreme Court, Parliament sat for 
only seventy-six days in 2006,103 with high absentee rates both in sessions 
and committee meetings.104 The Supreme Court’s active calendar allows it 
not only to take on many cases, but has also helped it to become a regular 
fixture in Indian public consciousness.  
The Court, though, does not spend much of its time dealing with large 
constitutional law questions or even public interest litigation concerning 
governance matters. Instead, it allots a large part of its schedule to 
surprisingly routine matters that come before it simply because the lower 
courts are not trusted. The Supreme Court breaks down all cases before it 
into forty-five categories.105 In 2007, the most regular hearing matters 
disposed of by the Court were criminal matters (20% of its docket), 
followed by civil service (14%), indirect tax (13%), ordinary civil (12%), 
and land acquisition (7%) matters.106 Public interest litigation, which 
garners much public attention, constituted only 1% of the Court’s regular 
hearing matters.107 Strikingly, five-, seven-, and nine-justice bench 
 
 
 100. Supreme Court of India, Calendar 2007, http://www.supremecourtofindia.nic.in/new_s/cal-
2007.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2008). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Supreme Court of the United States, Calendar, October Term 2006, http://www.supreme 
courtus.gov/oral_arguments/06termcourtcalendar.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2008). 
 103. Lok Sabha, Bulletin-1 Year: 2006, http://loksabha.nic.in (follow “Business” hyperlink; then 
follow “Bulletin-I” hyperlink; then follow “Archive” hyperlink; then follow “2006” hyperlink) (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2008). 
 104. SOCIAL WATCH INDIA, supra note 43, at 33; Parliament has decreased the number of days on 
which it sits from the 1960s and 1970s, when it sat for over 130 days. K.C. Pant, A ‘Loose’ Doctrine, 
in THE SUPREME COURT VERSUS THE CONSTITUTION: A CHALLENGE TO FEDERALISM 178, 186 (Pran 
Chopra ed., 2006). 
 105. See Supreme Court of India, http://www.supremecourtofindia.nic.in/subcat.htm (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2008). 
 106. This data is taken from Supreme Court of India, Year-wise, Subject Category-wise Disposal 
of Regular Hearing Matters During 2005–2007 (on file with author). 
 107. Id. 
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matters, which require the Supreme Court to decide important questions of 
constitutional law, are also a statistically minor part of the Supreme 
Court’s overall disposal rate in raw numbers (about 0.5%).108 As of June 
2008, there were 28,497 cases still awaiting admission hearings.109 
Moreover, 19,358 cases had been admitted but were awaiting regular 
hearing.110 
Because the Supreme Court is so engaged by the thousands of rather 
ordinary cases that come before it, as well as by high profile public 
interest litigation matters, it is difficult for the Court to find time to decide 
larger constitutional matters. Not only is a larger bench required for these 
matters, but oral arguments for a major constitutional law case can last 
days, if not weeks. During this time, the justices on the constitutional 
bench cannot undertake the Supreme Court’s other routine workload or 
supervise ongoing cases that have a direct impact on daily governance. 
Although these backlog and scheduling problems obviously have 
negative effects on the development of constitutional jurisprudence, this 
situation does (even if not by design) allow the Court to delay hearing 
certain cases. This has meant the Court has frequently been able to delay 
hearing some (although certainly not all) controversial questions until the 
political climate is more favorable. Thus, several basic structure doctrine 
cases have taken years, and sometimes decades, to reach the Court.  
Meanwhile, the role of seniority as an organizing mechanism in the 
Supreme Court has allowed individual justices to more easily press their 
vision for public interest litigation. To an outsider, it may seem strange 
that most of the Court’s benches are comprised of two justices, which 
could easily result in a tie. However, even though the entire Supreme 
Court will hear hundreds of cases a week, it is common that not a single 
split decision will result. When there is a difference of opinion, the junior 
justice typically acquiesces to the opinion of the senior. This emphasis on 
seniority in decision-making on two- and three-justice benches made it 
easier for a handful of likeminded senior justices to craft an expansive 
right to life jurisprudence, since most of these cases come before the 
smaller benches. The power of any individual Supreme Court justice, 
though, is curtailed by a mandatory retirement age of sixty-five.111  
 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Supreme Court of India, Monthly Statement for the Month of June 2008, http://www. 
supremecourtofindia.nic.in/new_s/pendingstat.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2008). 
 110. Id. 
 111. INDIA CONST. art. 124(2). 
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The Chief Justice is also determined by seniority. He (so far it has only 
been males) is the justice who has sat on the Court longest. The Chief 
Justice has a remarkably powerful position within the Indian judiciary. Not 
only does he appoint administrative staff for the Court,112 but he also has a 
heavy hand in assigning Supreme Court justices to different cases and 
appointing Supreme Court and High Court justices. No Chief Justice can 
develop control over the Court for long despite his wide influence, though, 
because the average term is rather short. From independence to Chief 
Justice Sabharwal’s retirement in 2007, the average term has been 602 
days, or slightly under two years. The median term has been 414.5 days.113  
The Chief Justice picks the justices who will sit on various cases, 
including larger constitutional benches. This power gives the Chief Justice 
potential influence over the Court’s decision. Over the past ten years, the 
Chief Justice has never been in dissent on a five-, seven-, or nine-justice 
bench matter on which he has sat.114 
The judiciary is basically self-selected, which provides insulation from 
outside political forces. Under the Constitution, the President appoints 
High Court members to the Supreme Court, but must do so in consultation 
with the Supreme Court, and in particular with the Chief Justice.115 In the 
1990s, the Supreme Court reinterpreted the Constitution to hold that a 
small collegium of senior justices headed by the Chief Justice would pick 
its own membership, and the role of the executive became more of a 
formality.116 This self-selection process is an example of the deep distrust 
the judiciary displays towards the elected branches, even as it raises 
questions about the judiciary’s own accountability.  
 
 
 112. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, supra note 91, at 17–20.  
 113. The large difference between the mode and mean can be accounted for in large part by Chief 
Justice Chandrachud’s exceptionally long tenure as Chief Justice in the 1970s and 1980s for more than 
seven years, which is about three years longer then the next longest occupant of the office. The mean 
and mode were determined by using the dates of appointment to and retirement from the office of 
Chief Justice. Supreme Court of India, Supreme Court Former CJIs, http://www.supremecourtof 
india.nic.in/new_s/f_cji.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2008).  
 114. This ten-year analysis of Chief Justice opinions was based upon an examination of cases 
retrieved under the various Chief Justices’ names from a search on Manupatra, an Indian legal 
database (on file with author). Although there is a high frequency of unanimous decisions on these 
benches, there have also been vigorous dissents and concurrences by other justices, and some of the 
opinions were likely compromise positions. Most of these opinions were not written by the Chief 
Justice. Further, the justices on the Supreme Court might have more uniform judicial opinions than in 
other supreme courts because their selection is largely apolitical and done through the Indian Supreme 
Court itself. Therefore, the phenomenon of Chief Justice majorities may be explained by a higher 
likelihood that the Chief Justice simply shared the opinions of the other justices on the Court.  
 115. INDIA CONST. art. 124. 
 116. Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Ass’n v. Union of India, (1993) Supp. 2 S.C.R. 659, 
777–78; see also In re: Presidential Reference, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 1. 
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Supreme Court justices are almost entirely picked from amongst the 
High Court justices, while High Court justices are generally picked from 
distinguished members of the bar and the lower judiciary. Since all the 
justices are lawyers, they are generally either from the middle class or 
wealthy. Lower castes, scheduled tribes, and women are all significantly 
underrepresented in the higher judiciary.117 The justices’ backgrounds 
arguably shape the perspective of their decisions and their understanding 
of what good governance entails.  
The Indian Supreme Court, at first glance, may not seem well equipped 
to advance a jurisprudence in which the higher judiciary undertakes such 
frequent and extensive interventions to further a broad conception of good 
governance. The Court oversees a chronically ill lower judiciary, which 
has resulted in a backlog of cases and has anachronistic filing and oral 
argument rules and procedures.118 Yet, because of its multiple smaller 
benches, its emphasis on seniority, its ability to process thousands of 
cases, and the insulation of its justices from the other political branches, it 
is uniquely well situated to assume these wider powers. Its institutional 
structure has allowed it to take on a far ranging role in Indian society, 
politics, and public consciousness.  
To be sure, the Court’s ability to reshape the balance of powers in India 
was fostered by both its own institutional structure and culture and the 
shortcomings of the country’s representative institutions. It was ultimately 
specific doctrines, though, like the basic structure doctrine and an 
expanded right to life jurisprudence, that widened the Court’s power. 
These doctrines were not necessarily inevitable, but were created by 
particular histories and the arguments and decisions made by individual 
justices. This Article will now turn to these doctrines to see how the Court 
used its distinctive institutional design to respond to the governance 
failures (real, perceived, or feared) of India’s representative institutions.  
 
 
 117. V. Venkatesan, Judiciary and Social Justice, FRONTLINE (India), Oct. 14–27, 2000, available 
at http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1721/17210960.htm (discussing caste disparities in the upper 
judiciary). Ruma Pal was the third woman to ever sit on the Supreme Court. She retired on June 3, 
2006. As of publication, there are no female justices on the Supreme Court. In Supreme Court 
Advocates-on-Record Ass’n, Justice Pandian provided statistics on the discrepancies and warned: “Our 
democratic polity is not only for any self perpetuating oligarchy but is for all people of our country.” 
(1993) Supp. 2 S.C.R. 659, 868 (Pandian, J., concurring). 
 118. See supra text accompanying notes 109–10. 
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IV. THE FIGHT FOR “THE VERY SOUL” OF THE CONSTITUTION,119 OR THE 
BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE  
The German Constitution famously bars amendments to Article One 
(human dignity) and its democratic and federal form of government.120 
Bruce Ackerman calls constitutions like Germany’s foundationalist.121 
They appeal to both a natural rights philosophy and the country’s 
historical experience to set fundamental rights and certain governing 
structures beyond democratic debate.122 He compares such foundationalist 
constitutions to dualist ones like that of the United States.123 In dualist 
democracies, certain key principles—like fundamental rights—are 
entrenched in the constitution.124 The constitution acts as a check on 
everyday governance, but the people can change any of its principles if 
they organize the super-majority necessary for constitutional 
amendment.125  
India is relatively unique in that its Constitution was drafted to be 
within the American dualist tradition, but has been interpreted by the 
Supreme Court as being essentially foundationalist. Despite this seeming 
incongruity, it is today widely accepted by Parliament and the public 
(although with sometimes vocal dissent) that the Constitution has a certain 
basic structure that cannot be amended. 
The basic structure doctrine was created in large part out of the 
immediate political circumstances in which the Court and the country 
found themselves. The Court justified its intervention on two grounds. 
First, it found that although the founders did not explicitly restrict 
amendment of the Constitution, there were implicit limits. Second, the 
Court argued that certain principles of “civilization” or good governance 
exist that all modern democracies must follow. Through these two 
justifications, the Court claimed that representative bodies, even 
constituent ones, are not free to remake their constitutions however they 
wish; rather, they have a duty to do so only within acceptable limits.126 
 
 
 119. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, Remarks at the Constituent Assembly of India Debates (Dec. 9, 1948), 
available at http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/LS/debates/vol7p23.htm (stating that the guarantee of 
judicial review to protect fundamental rights was at “the very soul of the Constitution and the very 
heart of it.”). 
 120. Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Federal Constitution] arts. 1, 20, 79. 
 121. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 15 (1991).  
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 12–15. 
 126. See infra Part V.B. 
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Despite these justifications, the Court has faced accountability and 
capacity criticisms directed at the basic structure doctrine. Before delving 
into the judicial underpinnings of and debates surrounding the doctrine, 
though, a bit of background is needed to understand the political context in 
which the doctrine developed. 
A. Historical Background 
It is easy to forget today that there were many competing visions for 
the future of India in the lead-up to independence. Subhas Chandra Bose, a 
leader in the pre-independence Congress Party, favored a stronger, more 
authoritarian state, modeled on the fascist governments of the 1930s and 
1940s.127 On the other extreme, Mahatma Gandhi advocated a more 
decentralized and self-sufficient society.128 
Neither Bose’s nor Gandhi’s vision would gain much traction during 
the Constitution’s drafting. Instead, one of the most entrenched debates at 
the Constituent Assembly—and one that would provide the historical 
seeds of the basic structure doctrine—was between the similar, but 
competing ideologies of Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Vallabhbhai 
Patel.129 Nehru and Patel were the two most powerful political leaders of 
the Congress Party at the end of British rule.130 Indeed, Nehru became the 
country’s first Prime Minister only upon Gandhi’s request that Patel step 
aside (Patel had been supported by more members of Congress to lead the 
party at independence).131 
Patel was a proponent of many of the principles of laissez-faire 
economics.132 Nehru, on the other hand, believed in large-scale property 
redistribution and nationalization to correct past social injustices and lay 
the groundwork for a prosperous economy.133 This position was popular 
amongst the poverty-stricken electorate, and even today polls indicate that 
the overwhelming majority of Indians believe that there should be a limit 
on possessing a certain amount of land and property.134  
 
 
 127. LLOYD I. RUDOLPH & SUSANNE HOEBER RUDOLPH, IN PURSUIT OF LAKSHMI 69 (1998). 
 128. Id. at 69–70. 
 129. Id. at 69. 
 130. Id. at 68–74. 
 131. Id. at 71–72. 
 132. See id. at 71. 
 133. Id. at 70–72; see also Sudipta Kaviraj, A Critique of the Passive Revolution, in STATE AND 
POLITICS IN INDIA, supra note 65, at 43, 57–58. 
 134. In a survey done around the 2004 national elections, almost sixty-eight percent of people 
somewhat or fully agreed that there should be a ban on possessing land and property above a certain 
limit. Ctr. for the Study of Developing Societies, Nat’l Elections Studies (NES) 2004 Marginals for All 
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According to Dr. Ambedkar this difference in economic perspective 
came to a head in the drafters’ debates over property rights.135 Nehru 
wanted no compensation for property seized by the government, while 
Patel demanded full compensation.136 The right to property in the final 
version of the Constitution was a compromise between the two, with 
ambiguity surrounding both when property could be taken and what 
compensation would be paid.137 
Patel’s early death in 1950 ensured not only that Nehru would never 
again be seriously challenged for the post of Prime Minister, but also that 
he could more easily push his original vision of the right to property. 
When early judicial decisions signaled that the courts would limit the 
government’s ability to expropriate property, Nehru’s government acted 
swiftly. In 1951, it passed the first amendment to the Constitution which 
created articles 31A and 31B.138 These articles would provide the origin of 
the dispute that would ultimately create the basic structure doctrine. 
Article 31A stated that any acquisition of property by the state through 
law could not be called into question under the rights to property, equality, 
freedom of speech, or freedom to practice one’s profession.139 Article 31B 
created the Ninth Schedule, a list of laws inserted in the back of the 
Constitution.140 Laws that were placed into this schedule through 
constitutional amendment could not be found invalid by the judiciary on 
the basis of any of the fundamental rights.141 In the First Amendment, 
thirteen land reform laws were placed into this protected schedule. 
Although the First Amendment only protected land reform laws, the Ninth 
Schedule could, on its face, be used to protect any law placed into it from 
fundamental rights review.  
After the passage of these two articles, a showdown between 
Parliament and the judiciary became almost inevitable. Parliament had 
amended the Constitution to shield not only expropriation laws, but 
potentially any law from fundamental rights review. With the very idea of 
meaningful judicial review under attack, the Court’s potential responses 
were limited. It could acquiesce to the amendment, admitting that it could 
 
 
Questions, Results to Question 30A, available at http://www.csdsdelhi.org/nes2004/ques.htm (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2008). 
 135. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, Rajya Sabha Debates (Mar. 19, 1951) in Parliamentary Debates, 1950–
52.  
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. INDIA CONST. arts. 31A–B. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
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be stripped of its power of judicial review, and hope a later Parliament 
would remove the offending articles, or, alternatively, it could search for a 
way to defend judicial review.  
The first attempt by the Court to salvage its review power came in 
1967 in Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, which challenged articles 31A and 
31B.142 This case arose two years after Nehru’s death. Since the other 
principle architects of the Constitution, such as Patel and Dr. Ambedkar, 
were already dead, only a few of the original founders were left to 
challenge the Court’s pronouncements on the Constitution. Further, the 
decision was announced only days after the Congress Party suffered a 
major setback at the polls. The party retained a majority in Parliament, but 
for the first time since independence it no longer had the two-thirds 
majority needed to pass a constitutional amendment on its own.  
In Golak Nath, the Court found that none of the fundamental rights 
could be amended.143 In a bit of inventive wordplay, it held that 
amendments should be understood as “law” under the Constitution.144 
Since the fundamental rights voided any “law” that was inconsistent with 
them, any attempt to amend them was void.145 
The Court’s decision in Golak Nath led to widespread outcry from both 
Parliament and the public. By placing all of the fundamental rights beyond 
amendment, the Court had also placed its more conservative interpretation 
of the right to property beyond amendment. The 1971 elections saw 
Congress and Indira Gandhi campaign on a populist platform against the 
Golak Nath decision and regain their two-thirds majority in Parliament. 
The government quickly passed amendments that directly challenged the 
Court’s declaration that the fundamental rights could not be amended and 
further shielded laws from fundamental rights review.146  
This constitutional showdown came to a head in Kesavananda Bharati 
v. State of Kerala.147 Decided in 1973 by an unprecedented thirteen 
justices, it is widely considered one of the most important Indian 
constitutional law cases. In the face of parliamentary and public pressure, 
 
 
 142. I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, (1967) 2 S.C.R. 762, 819. 
 143. Id. at 815. 
 144. Id. at 899. 
 145. Id.  
 146. INDIA CONST. art. 13(4): inserted by the Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1971 
(stating that amendments can be applied to fundamental rights section of the Constitution); Id. art. 
368(1) and (3): inserted by the Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1971 (stating that 
Parliament can amend any provision of the Constitution); Id. art. 31C: inserted by Constitution 
(Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971 (saving laws from certain fundamental rights review that the 
legislature declares furthers Directive Principles). 
 147. A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461. 
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the Court overruled Golak Nath.148 However, in a bare seven to six 
majority, it also held that although the fundamental rights could be 
amended, a certain “basic structure” to the Constitution could not.149 The 
opinion was heavily fractured (there were five opinions for the majority), 
leading to uncertainty about what the basic structure included. The justices 
in the majority, though, described the basic structure as containing such 
principles as judicial review, democracy, federalism, secularism, and many 
of the fundamental rights.150 
Even with this more conservative ruling, it was certainly unclear 
whether the Court had a powerful enough argument or adequate political 
influence to enforce its decision. The Emergency, however, would change 
this calculus decidedly in the Court’s favor.  
In June 1975, Indira Gandhi’s government declared an Emergency, 
suspending several fundamental rights and rounding up political 
opponents.151 Five months into this low point of Indian democracy, the 
Court decided Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (“Indira Gandhi”).152 
The case did not end the Emergency or remove Prime Minister Gandhi 
from power, but it did show the Court was willing to be an independent 
voice. A high court had earlier ruled that Indira Gandhi had committed 
corrupt practices in her election campaign and disqualified her from 
holding office for six years.153 In response, her government amended the 
Constitution to say that any challenge to the election of the person who is, 
or becomes, Prime Minister can be made only through a tribunal created 
by law. The judiciary would have no power to challenge such a law or the 
decision of the tribunal.154  
The Supreme Court struck down this amendment under the basic 
structure doctrine as violating the separation of powers and judicial 
 
 
 148. Id. at 1565. 
 149. Id. The Court limited its directions to striking down only part of article 31C, which had been 
added to the Constitution in 1971. This article protected laws from judicial scrutiny that the legislature 
declared furthered directive principles under the rights to property, equality, or freedom of 
expression/freedom to practice one’s own profession. It further held that the Court could not question 
the legislature’s finding that the law in question furthered a Directive Principle. Although the judgment 
was severely fractured, the Court struck down the article’s language that the judiciary could not judge 
whether the law in question furthered a Directive Principle. Id. at 1566. 
 150. See, e.g., id. at 1534–35. 
 151. S. P. SATHE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN INDIA: TRANSGRESSING BORDERS AND ENFORCING 
LIMITS 101 (2003). The Emergency suspended the right to petition courts for the enforcement of the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by articles 14 (equal protection of the laws), 21 (protection of life and 
personal liberty), and 22 (procedural rights of those detained). Id. 
 152. A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2299. 
 153. Id. at 2313. 
 154. Id. at 2340 (citing INDIA CONST. art. 329(A)).  
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review, both core principles of the Indian Constitution.155 However, in a 
politically pragmatic maneuver that also followed an existing line of 
precedent, the Court found Indira Gandhi’s election valid by upholding 
legislation that had retroactively removed the legal basis for her original 
conviction.156  
In response to the decision, Indira Gandhi’s government passed an 
amendment shortly thereafter declaring that there is no limit to 
Parliament’s constituent power, foreshadowing what could have become 
another constitutional standoff.157 Public opinion, though, was shifting 
against the Prime Minister. The abuses of the Emergency and Indira 
Gandhi’s subsequent loss in the polls when the Emergency ended in 1977 
would be seared into the Indian collective conscious.158 Parliament had 
discredited itself, and the Court’s basic structure doctrine seemed an 
increasingly sensible control.  
In 1978, the new government stripped the right to property of its 
fundamental rights status in the Constitution and moved it to another 
section (fittingly, further in the back).159 The Court did not challenge this 
development, thereby eliminating one of the primary points of perpetual 
conflict between the judiciary and Parliament. 
The Supreme Court has decided several cases involving the basic 
structure doctrine since Indira Gandhi. Most recently, in January 2007, the 
Court in I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu160 further developed its 
interpretation of article 31B, which created the Ninth Schedule to protect 
particular laws from fundamental rights review. Although originally only 
thirteen land reform laws were placed in the Ninth Schedule, more than 
280 laws have now been added to it through constitutional amendment.161 
Most of these laws concern land reform, but many do not, including some 
laws that relate to caste-based reservations and security laws from Indira 
Gandhi’s era. In a unanimous decision (a signal of the current health of the 
basic structure doctrine) the Court reasserted in Coelho that many, if not 
 
 
 155. Id. at 2355, 2385, 2469. 
 156. Id. at 2321–24. 
 157. INDIA CONST. art. 368(4) and (5): inserted by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) 
Act, 1976. 
 158. Indira Gandhi, in ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, http://www.britannica.com (search 
“Indira Gandhi”); see also R.C. Rajamani, Emergency: Memories of the Dark Midnight, HINDU BUS. 
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all, of the current fundamental rights were part of the basic structure of the 
Constitution, and that the laws in the Ninth Schedule would have to be 
tested by them.162  
B. Judicial Justification 
The missteps and weaknesses of Parliament and the executive have 
allowed the Supreme Court to successfully assert that India’s Constitution 
should be interpreted to have an unamendable basic structure. This victory 
was made possible by such factors as Parliament’s routine use of 
amendatory power, the loss of the founding voice of Nehru, the 
miscalculations of Indira Gandhi, and the weaknesses of a politically 
fractured Parliament. Further, the Constitution contained so many political 
and historical compromises that an attempt to rewrite the whole document 
would be dangerous for any parliament. The Court’s success did not come 
immediately, but rather with false starts like Golak Nath, when it 
misjudged the political salience of land reform laws.  
Yet the basic structure doctrine’s current triumph is not just a result of 
the judiciary’s evolving political fortunes, but also of the Court’s 
justifications for the doctrine. The Court taps into an understanding that 
constitutional rule based solely on “we the people,” and certainly “we the 
constitutional amendment,” may present great danger to a liberal 
democratic view of good governance, and can even be viewed as 
illegitimate. The Supreme Court asserts two justifications for this 
argument. First, it maintains that the Constitution, and the history out of 
which it was created, implicitly control Parliament’s amendatory power.163 
Second, it claims that Parliament’s amendatory power is trumped by 
removed and almost metaphysical civilizational norms that form the 
necessary skeleton of good governance.164 
The Court in Kesavananda Bharati used the founding’s unique place in 
Indian political history to make a series of intentionalist arguments in 
support of the basic structure doctrine.165 Justices argued that the word 
“amendment” could not possibly have been intended by the founders to 
mean the ability to destroy the fundamental features of the Constitution.166 
They also argued that the preamble was meant to express India’s story to 
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that point in history and the people’s true will. Therefore, the principles 
reflected in the preamble were intended to be beyond amendment.167 
Finally, the justices cast doubt on the ability of later constitutional 
amendments to communicate the people’s will, given that amendment in 
India is easier than in most other countries.  
The Court grounded the basic structure doctrine in the tangible 
historical moment of the creation of the Constitution. As Gary Jeffrey 
Jacobsohn has pointed out,168 there is something rather Burkean about this 
claim that rights, judicial review, democracy, and other elements of the 
basic structure doctrine are part of the story of the nation that should not 
be changed quickly, and that this constitutional narrative should instead be 
safeguarded by the nation’s justices.  
If the Court’s actions have some Burkean justification, though, 
Edmund Burke himself would probably not have agreed with the Court’s 
approach. As Bruce Ackerman has observed, India’s Constitution was 
born out of the Congress Party leading the nation’s long and popular 
struggle for independence.169 At the end of this successful struggle, the 
Party became a “credible vehicle for popular sovereignty.”170 It used this 
temporary charismatic authority to make the Constitution an enduring 
symbol of national unity that would outlast the Party’s own political 
fortunes.171 The Court does not argue, however, that there are no other 
constitutional moments in Indian history with sufficient authority to 
change these fundamental principles articulated by the Constituent 
Assembly (although this argument is plausible).172 Rather, it argues that no 
future constitutional moments (short of a new constitutional convention) 
could change these fundamental features of the Constitution. In finding 
that the Constitution’s creation is the only pure constitutional moment and 
certain features of it cannot change with the people’s desires or the needs 
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of the times, the Court privileges this historical moment more than Burke 
likely would.  
The Court justifies the basic structure doctrine not only with the 
historical moment of the founding, but also with a conception of what a 
properly ordered society should be. It, therefore, makes a good governance 
argument. Even if the Court does not acknowledge it explicitly, this 
second justification allows the Court to potentially take into account the 
changing needs of the country in the future. It also provides a justification 
for the doctrine that is decidedly different from the reasoning one would 
find in the American liberal tradition—that is, the idea that a constituent 
body’s enactments must not merely conform to the will of the people, but 
also to the norms of good governance. The Court roots its conception of 
such a correctly structured society in the Constitution, the practices of 
democratic and civilized nations as documented through history, and the 
requirements of bringing order to a country like India.  
As already noted, in Indira Gandhi, the Court challenged Parliament’s 
ability to pass an amendment barring the judiciary from reviewing the 
election of the Prime Minister. The five-justice bench produced five 
opinions, but each struck down some provisions of the questionable 
amendment under the basic structure doctrine. The Court invoked broader 
principles of civilization or good governance for two purposes. First, the 
justices wished to justify that judicial review of the amending process (i.e., 
the basic structure doctrine) is part of a modern amendment process. 
Second, through the same logic, the justices argued that judicial review 
itself is such a closely held norm of modern civilization that it must be part 
of the Constitution’s basic structure, and so Parliament cannot protect 
election outcomes from judicial review through amendment.  
Justice Beg’s opinion in Indira Gandhi supports the basic structure 
doctrine with an argument that is both pragmatic in its fear of sovereignty 
resting solely in the people’s representative institutions, and idealistic in 
its embrace of the Constitution. He found that “[o]ur concepts of 
sovereignty must accord with the needs of the people of our country.”173 
Justice Beg continued: 
[T]he concept of the Supremacy of the Constitution is, undoubtedly, 
more suited to the needs of our country than any other so far put 
forward. It not only places before us the goals towards which the 
nation must march but it is meant to compel our Sovereign 
Republic, with its three organs of Government to proceed in certain 
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directions. . . . Can we deny [the Constitution] that supremacy 
which is the symbol and proof of the level of our civilisation?174 
In explaining the necessity of a separation of powers in the amendment 
process, and by implication within the Constitution more generally, Justice 
Mathew’s opinion in Indira Gandhi contrasts a “less civilized” pre-British 
Indian sovereign:  
A sovereign in any system of civilized jurisprudence is not like an 
oriental despot who can do anything he likes, in any manner he likes 
and at any time he likes. That the Nizam of Hyderabad had 
legislative, judicial and executive powers and could exercise any 
one of them by a firman has no relevance when we are considering 
how a pro-sovereign—the holder of the amending power—in a 
country governed by a constitution should function.175  
In his concurring opinion, Justice Chandrachud finds that even despots 
recognize the legitimacy that comes with judicial checks on their power. 
He then echoes Justice Mathews’s remarks that this is certainly true in a 
modern democracy as well: 
The most despotic Monarch in the modern world prefers to be 
armed, even if formally, with the opinion of his Judges on the 
grievances of his subjects. . . .  
 I find it contrary to the basic tenets of our Constitution to hold 
that the Amending Body is an amalgam of all powers—legislative, 
executive and judicial. “Whatever pleases the emperor has the force 
of law” is not an article of democratic faith. The basis of our 
Constitution is a well-planned legal order . . . .176 
Justice Beg, in his interpretation of the basic structure doctrine in 
Indira Gandhi, discusses the different checks on sovereign power that 
have existed throughout history to show that judicial review is an integral 
part of good governance.177 Amongst several examples, he writes: 
The ideal King, in ancient India, was conceived of primarily as a 
Judge deciding cases or giving orders to meet specific situations in 
accordance with the Dharma Shastras. It also appears that the actual 
exercise of the power to administer justice was often delegated by 
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the King to his judges in ancient India. Indeed, according to some, 
the theory of separation of powers appears to have been carried so 
far . . . that the King could only execute the legal sentence passed by 
the Judge. . . . In the practical administration of justice, we are 
informed, Muslim caliphs acknowledged and upheld the jurisdiction 
of their Kazis to give judgment against them personally.178 
In the earlier and landmark Kesavananda Bharati, Justice Khanna 
attempts to reject the argument that there are “limitations which must be 
read in the Constitution . . . because they are stated to be based upon 
certain higher values which are very dear to the human heart and are 
generally considered essential traits of civilized existence.”179 Yet, even he 
winds up trying to identify these “essential traits of civilized existence” 
when he describes why the right to property should not be included in the 
basic structure of the Constitution. He notes that since what constitutes the 
right to property has changed “from time to time,” this right does not have 
as great a claim to being part of the basic structure.180 Further, he looks to 
broader governance norms to explain why the right to property may at 
times need to be supplemented to development needs, and so should not be 
considered part of the basic structure: 
The modern states have . . . to take steps with a view to ameliorate 
the conditions of the poor and to narrow the chasm which divides 
them from the affluent sections of the population. . . . Quite often in 
the implementation of these policies, the state is faced with the 
problem of conflict between the individual rights and interests on 
the one side and rights and welfare of vast sections of the 
population on the other. The approach which is now generally 
advocated for the resolving of the above conflict is to look upon the 
rights of the individuals as conditioned by social responsibility.181 
Although Justice Khanna rejects the idea that the right to property falls 
under the basic structure doctrine, justices often invoke the fundamental 
rights of the Constitution as being part of or at least related to its basic 
structure. Sometimes the justices rely on a natural rights argument to make 
this claim. Justice Reddy in Kesavananda Bharati finds that “the framers 
of our Constitution could not have provided for the freedoms inherent as a 
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part of the right of civilised man to be abrogated or destroyed.”182 Justice 
Gibbs, in the same case, seems to find at least some fundamental rights 
“inalienable.”183 More often, though, justices do not claim that 
fundamental rights are natural or inalienable, but instead that they are 
necessary for good governance in a modern democracy. In this way, later 
judicial reasoning on the relationship of fundamental rights to the basic 
structure doctrine echoes Justice Palekar’s view in his dissent in 
Kesavananda Bharati:  
The absolute concepts of Liberty and Equality are very difficult to 
achieve as goals in the present day organized society. The 
fundamental rights have an apparent resemblance to them but are 
really no more than rules which a civilized government is expected 
to follow in the governance of the country whether they are 
described as fundamental rules or not.184 
In Minerva Mills v. Union of India,185 a leading basic structure doctrine 
case from 1980, Chief Justice Chandrachud takes a similarly utilitarian 
stance when he finds that “[f]undamental rights occupy a unique place in 
the lives of civilized societies . . . .”186 He argues that certain rights are 
“elementary for the proper and effective functioning of a democracy. They 
are universally so regarded, as is evident from the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.”187 He then uses the Privy Council as an example of how 
“[m]any countries in the civilised world have parted with their sovereignty 
in the hope and belief that their citizens will enjoy human freedoms.”188 
He finds that although the emphasis of the Directive Principles on a social 
and economic revolution is important, what makes a “real democracy” is 
that it “will endeavour to achieve its objectives through the discipline of 
fundamental freedoms . . . .”189 
International human rights agreements are also relied upon as examples 
of more universal norms of good governance. In arguing that the basic 
structure doctrine should allow for more emphasis on social redistribution, 
Justice Bhagwati in Minerva Mills points out that: 
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[t]here are also two International Covenants adopted by the General 
Assembly for securing human rights, one is the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the other is the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
Both are international instruments relating to human rights. It is 
therefore not correct to say that Fundamental Rights alone are based 
on human rights while Directive Principles fall in some category 
other than human rights.190 
In Coelho in 2007, Chief Justice Sabharwal approvingly paraphrased 
Amartya Sen’s argument that “the justification for protecting fundamental 
rights is not on the assumption that they are higher rights, but that 
protection is the best way to promote a just and tolerant society.”191  
Whether invoking natural, moral, historical, or utilitarian grounds, the 
Court justifies the principles of the basic structure doctrine by appealing to 
core elements of what it argues is needed for good governance. Modern 
democratic civilization, and its mandates, are made a bar to Parliament’s 
constituent powers. 
C. Accountability and Capacity Concerns 
The criticisms of the Court’s basic structure doctrine can largely be 
divided into accountability and capacity concerns. Some argue that the 
doctrine is inherently undemocratic because the Supreme Court (an 
unelected institution) blocks amendments that a super-majority of the 
people’s representatives support.192 Further, critics like Pran Chopra argue 
that the basic structure doctrine undermines the Constitution itself by 
weakening the stature of Parliament.193 By taking power out of the hands 
of the people, it is more likely someone else will do the same.194 
Proponents of the basic structure doctrine, though, argue that the 
doctrine is necessary to protect the requirements of a democratic order.195 
For people who fear the abuses of an unchecked Parliament, the doctrine 
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helps create confidence in the democratic process. It may therefore help 
prevent the rise of a non-democratic order that promises stability and the 
protection of certain basic rights. 
The Court, however, has not been that effective in stopping the abuses 
of Parliament. Although the Court stood up to Indira Gandhi during the 
Emergency, it let her remain in power, and it might not have been able to 
oust her if it desired. Further, during the Emergency the Court explicitly 
supported Indira Gandhi’s sweeping view of her emergency powers.196 As 
some critics of the basic structure doctrine like to point out, it was the 
people who voted her out.197 The democratic system worked. However, 
this was only after a miscalculation on her part that she would win the 
election and thus could end the Emergency. She was also voted 
overwhelmingly back into power by the people in 1980. So the electoral 
check was certainly not perfect either.  
Finally, the basic structure doctrine was born of perceived necessity. 
Without it the Court might have suffered a continuing erosion of its power 
of judicial review. Certainly, other democracies have had no judicial 
review, but if there is a benefit to a judicial constitutional check, then the 
doctrine has helped ensure that this benefit continues to be felt.  
For many Indians it has come down to a question of what they fear 
more: a controlling Supreme Court that may develop confining 
interpretations of the Constitution, or the specter of an unchecked 
Parliament running over the core provisions of the Constitution. So far, the 
basic structure doctrine’s opponents have not had enough support to 
seriously threaten it.  
The doctrine’s insistence on good or “civilized” governance is not an 
isolated case of the Court embracing additional powers. Instead, the 
doctrine is part of a broader trend in Indian liberalism, as the Court’s 
expansive right to life jurisprudence shows.  
V. THE RIGHT TO LIFE: RULE THROUGH RIGHTS 
The Constitution’s Directive Principles lay out goals for the Indian 
state, such as a living wage, primary education for all, and international 
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peace and security.198 The Constitution, though, explicitly made these 
principles nonjusticiable. This decision reflected Dr. Ambedkar’s view 
that all rights should have clear remedies, and that constitutions should not 
be filled with “pious declarations” of unenforceable rights.199  
Although the Constitution did not on its face give the Supreme Court a 
mandate to enforce social and economic rights like those in the Directive 
Principles, the Court gradually interpreted this to be its role. This 
evolution, sparked by the Emergency, built momentum in the face of mass 
poverty across the country and was allowed to expand in the governance 
vacuum created by the country’s representative institutions. Like the basic 
structure doctrine, the Court largely justified these interventions on two 
grounds. First, it interpreted an active role for itself under the 
Constitution’s vision for controlled social and economic revolution. 
Second, the Court appealed to principles of civilization or good 
governance that necessitated and explained its interventions.  
Through the Court’s right to life jurisprudence, it took on many details 
of governance, like ordering more stringent enforcement of traffic 
regulations or banning smoking in public places.200 Indeed, the Court took 
on so many functions that its right to life jurisprudence came to encompass 
more than just protecting life, but also promoting good governance more 
broadly. 
This role is highlighted well by M.C. Mehta v. Union of India,201 the 
Taj Mahal case of 1997. This case brought to the attention of the Supreme 
Court that coal-fired industries around the Taj Mahal were tarnishing its 
white marble and polluting the lungs of nearby residents (although 
presumably no more than in other areas in India with coal-based 
industries). Citing the need to protect this wonder of civilization, the Court 
invoked its right to life jurisprudence and ordered that none of the 
polluting industries could operate in the immediate area. The Court had 
seemingly found the right to life in an inanimate object. Indeed, this case 
highlights that what is at stake for the Court in many of its right to life 
cases is not so much the right to life as good governance more generally 
(of which the protection of life and its basic necessities is only one part).  
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A. Background 
Article 21 of the Constitution is relatively short: “No person shall be 
deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure 
established by law.”202 In the Court’s early history, the article was 
interpreted narrowly to give it little judicial bite.203 The Emergency, 
though, led the Court to reexamine the article, beginning a process of 
reinterpretation that would balloon its meaning over the next two decades.  
Despite the Court’s proclamations regarding a supreme constitution in 
Indira Gandhi, the judiciary had largely failed to check the Prime 
Minister’s civil rights abuses during the Emergency.204 Not surprisingly, 
article 21’s initial expansion was aimed at helping better secure these civil 
rights. In 1978, the Court added a reasonableness, or non-arbitrariness, 
requirement to article 21. In doing so, it created natural justice or 
substantive due process in Indian jurisprudence.205 The next few years saw 
article 21 used to outlaw cruel or unusual punishment,206 relax pre-trial 
bail requirements,207 restrict the conditions under which a debtor can be 
imprisoned,208 create rights against custodial violence209 and inordinate 
delays in criminal trials,210 and provide legal aid.211 
The Supreme Court embraced this more populist direction in part to 
regain the legitimacy it had lost during the Emergency and in its early 
decisions, which often sided with wealthy property owners. The Court was 
also caught up in the post-Emergency euphoria, a sense of excitement at 
the return of liberal democracy that swept the major institutions of Indian 
government at this time.212 Further, the urban middle class, which had 
been targeted during the Emergency, now desired to see a strong 
independent judiciary to check the state’s power. The press, which had 
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been reticent to report on Indira Gandhi’s abuses, increasingly covered not 
only civil rights abuses, but also other social problems with new vigor.213  
Beginning in the mid-1980s, and then much more quickly in the 1990s, 
the Court expanded its article 21 jurisprudence even further to try to tackle 
not only the problems of the criminal justice system and government 
repression, but also social injustices more broadly. A litany of rights were 
read into the right to life, including the rights to fresh air and water,214 land 
for tribal populations,215 protection from environmental degradation,216 
shelter,217 health,218 education,219 and food and clothing.220 This new 
interventionism was born at a time when Parliament and the country’s 
other representative institutions were increasingly politically fractured and 
viewed as abdicating their governance responsibilities.  
The growth of article 21 jurisprudence also led to the development of a 
new form of legal practice, called public interest litigation. The Court 
relaxed its standing requirement, allowing any public-minded person to 
petition the Court on behalf of anyone he or she perceived as being 
deprived of his or her rights.221  
It also loosened its filing requirements. For example, when a journalist 
wrote the Court in 1982, complaining that certain female suspects were 
tortured in police custody, the Court treated the letter as a petition and 
gave directions to ensure protection of these women and other prisoners in 
similar situations.222 This action by the Court spawned a practice of 
persons writing letters asking the Court to intervene on pressing social 
issues. In 2006, the Supreme Court received almost twenty thousand such 
letters from across the country.223 These letters are screened on 
predetermined criteria by the PIL division of the Registrar and by the 
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Registrar him- or herself. After this initial filtering, only about one percent 
of these letters are placed before the Court as admission matters.224 
This new public interest litigation often touched on large and complex 
social issues. In response, the Court shifted from an adversarial to a more 
inquisitorial judicial model. To aid in research, the Supreme Court created 
commissions to gather data and present recommendations on the issues 
presented in a complaint.225 The Court also began to exercise continuing 
jurisdiction over cases, issuing preliminary interim orders and then 
periodic follow-up orders.226  
Judicial intervention in social and economic rights cases is relatively 
common around the world, but the level of intervention found in India is 
rather dramatic. There are five different types of positive interventions that 
courts around the world use to enforce social and economic rights, all of 
which are also found in India: (1) courts may simply articulate that a right 
exists without necessarily enforcing it, (2) the judiciary may apply an anti-
retrogression principle to prevent the government from unreasonably 
withdrawing entitlements it currently provides (a technique seen in 
Goldberg v. Kelly in the United States),227 (3) courts may require that the 
government provide a reasonable plan for the progressive realization of a 
social and economic right (this type of intervention is epitomized in the 
South African model of enforcement),228 (4) the judiciary can give a one-
time order to implement a government program that furthers a social and 
economic right (many courts in Latin America have followed this path),229 
 
 
 224. Id. 
 225. The Court has appointed district magistrates, district judges, professors, journalists, officers 
of the court, and even practicing advocates to direct investigations into the alleged complaints and then 
report to the Court. Soli J. Sorabjee, Protection of Fundamental Rights by Public Interest Litigation, in 
PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IN SOUTH ASIA: RIGHTS IN SEARCH OF REMEDIES 30–31 (Sara Hossain, 
Shahdeen Malik, & Bushra Musa eds., 1997). 
 226. Clarence Dias, The Impact of Social Activism and Movements for Legal Reform in South 
Asia, in PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IN SOUTH ASIA, supra note 225, at 8. 
 227. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); see also Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE 
L.J. 733, 783–85 (1964); U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights [OHCHR], Comm. on 
Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment 3 to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (Dec. 14, 1990) (barring retrogressive measures to fulfillment of social and 
economic rights). 
 228. Gov’t of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Irene Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at 
¶ 99(2)(a) (S. Afr.); Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign and Others 2002 (5) SA 721 
(CC) at ¶ 38 (S. Afr.); International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, art. 2, Dec. 
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 229. Decision T-505 of 1992, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), Diego Serna Gomez c. 
Hospital Universitario del Valle “Evaristo Garcia” (Colom. 1992) (Colombian Supreme Court case 
ordering that AIDS treatment must be provided to those who need it); Decision 456 of 2002, Glenda 
López c. Instituto Venezolano de Seguros Sociales (2001) (Venezuelan Supreme Court case ordering 
that ARVs (antiretroviral drugs) must be provided in a consistent manner); Asociación Benghalensis v. 
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and (5) courts may monitor and give orders concerning the 
implementation of a government program over a period of time. Options 
(4) and (5) entail an added level of intrusion depending on whether the 
court orders the implementation of a pre-existing program, the creation of 
a new element to a government scheme, or an entirely new scheme. 
Additionally, the level of intrusion varies depending on whether the court 
orders the scheme for one person or an entire class of persons.  
The Indian Supreme Court has extended its power even further than 
these basic categories might suggest. For example, the Court has set up 
quasi-executive authorities to implement its orders. One such court-created 
authority protects and regulates all coastal areas in the country. It can 
independently punish those violating of the Court’s directions and receives 
a continuous budget from the government.230  
B. Judicial Justification 
Like the Moghal emperors of earlier times, who hung bells outside 
their palace that commoners could ring to bring their sufferings to the 
emperor’s attention, the Court has taken on an expansive role in hearing 
the governance grievances of Indians.231 The Court has justified its 
broadened right to life jurisprudence through a wide interpretation of its 
powers under a constitution that pledges social and economic upliftment. 
It also has invoked principles of good governance that all civilized 
societies must further. Although at times separate justifications, the two 
are inter-linked as each supports, and in some ways defines, the other’s 
content (i.e., general principles in the Constitution are made more specific 
with reference to civilizational norms, while some of these broader norms 
are often further defined in Constitutional provisions). 
To find constitutional justification for its expanded article 21 
interventions, the Court increasingly cited the Constitution’s preamble. 
The preamble states that India is a socialist state that seeks social, 
economic, and political justice, works for equality of status and 
 
 
Ministerio de Salud y Acción Social, Estado Nacional [L.L. 2000-B] 126 (Argentinian Supreme Court 
case ordering that anti-retroviral drugs be provided in a timely and consistent manner). 
 230. S. Jagannath v. Union of India, (1996) Supp. 9 S.C.R. 848. 
 231. As Justice Chandrachud comments in Indira Gandhi, “The Moghal Emperor, Jehangir, was 
applauded as a reformist because soon after his accession to the throne in 1605, he got a golden chain 
with sixty bells hung in his palace so that the common man could pull it and draw the attention of the 
Ruler to his grievances and sufferings.” Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2299, 
2471. 
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opportunity, and promotes fraternity to assure individual dignity.232 The 
Court also frequently appealed to the Directive Principles for 
constitutional justification, indirectly making many of the Directive 
Principles justiciable through its right to life jurisprudence.233 In M.C. 
Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu, in which the Court abolished some forms of 
child labor, Justice Hansaria found that since all organs of government are 
directed to apply the Directive Principles, the Court should also consider 
them when deciding “matters of great public concern.”234 In Kasturi Lal 
Lakshmi Reddy v. State of Jammu & Kashmir,235 Justice Bagwati 
explained the relationship between the Directive Principles and the 
judiciable fundamental rights in public interest litigation:  
The Directive Principles concretise and give shape to the concept of 
reasonableness envisaged in [the fundamental rights] . . . . By 
defining the national aims and the constitutional goals, they set forth 
the standards or norms of reasonableness which must guide and 
animate governmental action. Any action taken by the Government 
with a view to giving effect to any one or more of the Directive 
Principles would ordinarily . . . qualify for being regarded as 
reasonable, while an action which is inconsistent with or runs 
counter to a Directive Principle would incur the reproach of being 
unreasonable. . . . 
 What according to the founding fathers constitutes the plainest 
requirement of public interest is set out in the Directive Principles 
and they embody par excellence the constitutional concept of public 
interest.236 
The increasing invocation of the Directive Principles and the preamble 
to justify the Court’s broadening interventions sits side-by-side with 
appeals to public interest or civilization to support and define its right to 
life jurisprudence. In Chameli Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh,237 the Court 
 
 
 232. The Court is typical in finding, “The preamble and Article 38 [the right to petition the 
Supreme Court] of the Constitution of India—the supreme law, envisions social justice as its arch to 
ensure life to be meaningful and liveable with human dignity.” Consumer Educ. & Research Ctr. v. 
Union of India, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 922, 938. 
 233. M.C. Mehta v. India, (1996) Supp. 10 S.C.R. 266; Chameli Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 
(1995) Supp. 6 S.C.R. 827, 834; L.I.C. of India v. Consumer Educ. & Research Ctr., (1995) Supp. 1 
S.C.R. 349.  
 234. M.C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1996) Supp. 9 S.C.R. 726, at 739. 
 235. (1980) 3 S.C.R. 1338. 
 236. Id. at 1341. This concept of the relationship between the Constitution’s provisions, such as 
the Directive Principles, and public interest is pushed even further in the earlier cases.  
 237. (1995) Supp. 6 S.C.R. 827. 
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found that the “[r]ight to live guaranteed in any civilised society implies 
the right to food, water, decent environment education, medical care and 
shelter. These are basic human rights known to any civilised society.”238 In 
Consumer Education & Research Centre v. India,239 the Court held that 
the right to life provides that the state must provide facilities to its people 
for a minimum standard of “health, economic security and civilised living. 
. . .”240 In LIC of India v. Consumer Education Research & Centre,241 a 
case dealing with equity issues in the insurance industry, the Court 
explained, “Every action of the public authority or the person acting in 
public interest or its acts give rise to public element [sic], should be guided 
by public interest.”242 It went on to find that “[t]he appellants or any 
person or authority in the field of insurance owe a public duty to evolve 
their policies subject to such reasonable, just and fair terms and conditions 
accessible to all the segments of the society for insuring the lives of 
eligible persons.”243 
The Court again invoked these broader meta-governance standards in 
Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimalal Totame,244 when it said:  
Basic needs of man have traditionally been accepted to be three—
food, clothing and shelter. The right to life is guaranteed in any 
civilized society. That would take within its sweep the right to food, 
the right to clothing, the right to decent environment and a 
reasonable accommodation to live in. The difference between the 
need of an animal and a human being for shelter has to be kept in 
view.245  
 
 
 238. Id. at 834. In Consumer Educ. & Research Ctr. v. Union of India, the Court noted, “Law is 
the ultimate aim of every civilised society as a key system in a given era, to meet the needs and 
demands of its time.” A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 922, 938. It went on to explain that in India these demands 
mean that: 
Social security, just and humane conditions of work and leisure to workman are part of his 
meaningful right to life and to achieve self-expression of his personality and to enjoy the life 
with dignity, the State should provide facilities and opportunities to them to reach at least 
minimum standard of health, economic security and civilised living while sharing according 
to the capacity, social and cultural heritage. 
Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id.  
 241. (1995) Supp. 1 S.C.R. 349. 
 242. Id. at 366. 
 243. Id. at 382. 
 244. A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 630. 
 245. Id. at 633. 
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The Court has several other times also picked up on this theme that the 
right to life means something more than mere animal existence.246 As the 
Court explained in Chameli Singh, “The ultimate object of making a man 
equipped with a right to dignity of person and equality of status is to 
enable him to develop himself into a cultured being.”247 
The Court often contrasts itself against government authorities that 
seem unwilling or unable to look after the people’s welfare, including 
even enforcing preexisting law. As Justice Iyer laments in a case in which 
he orders a city to improve its sewage system, “the crying demand for 
basic sanitation and public drains fell on deaf ears.”248 In the face of such 
neglect, Justice Iyer remarks, “one wonders whether our municipal bodies 
are functional irrelevances, banes rather than booms and ‘lawless’ by long 
neglect, not leaders of the people in local self-government.”249 In Bandhua 
Mukti Morcha v. Union of India,250 the Court implicitly reprimands the 
government in stressing, “We must not be content with the law in books 
but we must have law in action.”251 Again in M.C. Mehta v. Union of 
India, the Court directs, “Rule of law is the essence of Democracy. It has 
to be preserved. Laws have to be enforced.”252 
Like the basic structure doctrine, pursuant to which Justice Beg 
observed that “[o]ur concepts of sovereignty must accord with the needs of 
the people of our country,”253 the Court has found that its right to life 
jurisprudence is a product of the particular social and economic demands 
of India. In LIC of India, the Court explains: 
[W]hen new challenges are thrown open, the law must grow as 
social engineering to meet the challenges and every endeavour 
should be made to cope with the contemporary demands to meet 
socio-economic challenges under rule of law and have to be met 
either by discarding the old and unsuitable or adjusting legal system 
to the changing socio-economic scenario.254 
 
 
 246. See Consumer Educ. & Research Ctr. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 922; Chameli 
Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1995) Supp. 6 S.C.R. 827, 833 (“In any organised society, right to live 
as a human being is not ensured by meeting only the animal needs of man.”). 
 247. Chameli Singh, (1995) Supp. 6 S.C.R. 827, 834. 
 248. Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Shri Vardichand et al., (1981) 1 S.C.R. 97, 100. 
 249. Id. at 106. 
 250. A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 802, 834. 
 251. Id. at 144.  
 252. (2006) 2 S.C.R. 264, at 269. 
 253. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2299, 2440. 
 254. L.I.C. of India v. Consumer Educ. & Research Ctr., (1995) Supp. 1 S.C.R. 349. 
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To remain relevant to an economically desperate population with an 
often unresponsive government, the Court has reasoned that it must 
expand its mandate. The Court’s broad interpretation of its powers under 
the Constitution and its invocation of minimum core requirements of 
civilized governance are central to justifying these larger social 
interventions.  
C. Accountability Concerns 
Some critics of the Supreme Court’s expansive right to life 
jurisprudence argue that the Court, as the theoretically least accountable 
branch of government, should restrain from attempting to undertake such 
broad good governance interventions. More recently, the justices 
themselves have become increasingly vocal in expressing these concerns. 
Justice Katju, a leading proponent of reigning in the Court’s expansionist 
view of its powers, declared in 2007: 
Judges must know their limits and must not try to run the 
Government. They must have modesty and humility, and not behave 
like Emperors. . . . [I]t is not the business of this Court to pronounce 
policy. [The Court] must observe a fastidious regard for limitations 
on its own power, and this precludes the Court’s giving effect to its 
own notions of what is wise or politic.255  
As Justice Katju suggests, the Court has generally placed few 
limitations on when it will intervene in right to life matters. The Court 
normally refrains from interfering in economic policy256 and tends not to 
make decisions that require explicit budgetary allocation (even if its orders 
often require significant new government spending). Further, the Court 
will sometimes declare, like Justice Katju, that it does not make policy 
(although many of the Court’s decisions have either directly influenced or, 
arguably, created policy). Although these restrictions are sometimes laid 
out by the Court, what is remarkable to many foreign (and domestic) 
observers is how few limits, or even justifications, are given by the Court 
in its right to life interventions.  
 
 
 255. Divisional Manager, Aravali Golf Club v. Chander Hass (Dec. 6, 2007), available at 
http://indiankanoon.com/doc/47602/.  
 256. BALCO Employees Union v. Union of India, (2001) Supp. 5 S.C.R. 511, at 539. 
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Take People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India257 (the “Right 
to Food Case”)—the ongoing right to food case—for example. In 
sweeping and detailed interim orders in November 2001, the Supreme 
Court directed all state governments to fully implement eight different 
centrally sponsored welfare schemes.258 The Court ordered full 
implementation of the enormous public distribution system,259 which 
provides subsidized grain to poor people across the country.260 It directed 
that all states provide a cooked mid-day meal in their schools, under what 
had previously been a voluntary national program.261 The Court also 
ordered the implementation of programs that gave money to destitute 
seniors, poor pregnant women, and impoverished families when their 
primary breadwinner dies.262 The Court required implementation of the 
Integrated Child Development Scheme (“ICDS”), which provides services 
such as immunization, supplementary nutrition, and pre-school education 
to young children and their mothers.263 It also directed that there should be 
an ICDS disbursement center in every settlement.264 In addition to these 
eight programs dealt with in the November order, the Court later directed 
that the government’s work-for-food scheme be expeditiously 
implemented.265 To supervise all these directions, the Supreme Court 
appointed two commissioners to investigate grievances, monitor the 
order’s implementation, and make recommendations to the Court.266 The 
 
 
 257. People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India (Writ Petition [Civil] No. 196 of 
2000). 
 258. People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India, Order of Nov. 28, 2001 (on file 
with author) [hereinafter Order of Nov. 28, 2001]. The orders stemming from the PUCL Right to Food 
Case are also available in SOCIO LEGAL INFO. CTR., RIGHT TO FOOD (Colin Gonsalves, P. Ramesh 
Kumar & Kumar Srivastava eds., 2005). 
 259. The order involved both the Public Distribution System (“PDS”) and Antyodaya Anna 
Yojana, which is a component of the PDS aimed at the poorest of the poor. Specifically, the Court 
directed that the states identify the millions of poor families that still do not receive their benefits and 
give them access to subsidized grain by January 2002. Order of Nov. 28, 2001, supra note 258, at 1–2. 
 260. Id.  
 261. Id. at 3–4. 
 262. Id. at 4, 6–7. 
 263. Id. at 5–6. 
 264. Id. at 5. This direction was expanded in later orders to guarantee an ICDS center on demand, 
and directed the government to have 1.4 million ICDS centers by December 2008. Right to Food 
Campaign Website, ICDS: Key Directions in Supreme Court Orders, http://www.righttofoodindia.org/ 
icds/icds_orders.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2008). 
 265. People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India, Order of May 8, 2002, 1–3, 
available at http://www.hrln.org/admin/issue.php?id=14&pil=1&pilid=18 (follow “Supreme Court 
Order 08-05-02” hyperlink).  
 266. Id. at 4; People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India, Order of Oct. 29, 2002, 
available at http://www.hrln.org/admin/issue.php?id=14&pil=1&pilid=18 (follow “Supreme Court 
Order 29-10-02” hyperlink) [hereinafter Order of Oct. 29, 2002].  
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state governments were instructed to appoint nodal officers and assistants 
to supply these commissioners with needed information.267  
The Court’s orders in the Right to Food Case enmeshed it in many of 
the country’s major welfare schemes, yet the Court did not provide any 
explicit constitutional justification for its intervention until almost two 
years after its initial November 2001 orders. In finally justifying its 
intervention the Court said:  
The anxiety of the Court is to see that the poor and destitute and the 
weaker sections of the society do not suffer from hunger and 
starvation. The prevention of the same is one of the prime 
responsibilities of the Government—whether Central or the State. 
Mere schemes without any implementation are of no use.268  
In not further explaining when and why it will take action—beyond broad 
appeals to the right to life or the necessities of good governance—the 
Court seems to imply that there has been a generalized governance failure 
and that specific judicial interventions do not require elaborate 
justification. Yet, more precise justifications could arguably help calm 
some of the accountability fears the Court faces, or at least better explain 
the Court’s actions.  
As the Court in the Right to Food Case points out, “Mere schemes 
without any implementation are of no use.”269 Many of the Supreme 
Court’s orders in right to life cases are simply an attempt to implement 
preexisting legislation that the state is not putting into practice itself. In 
these situations, the Court can claim that it is just enforcing the law 
Parliament has already passed. This argument would give the Court more 
democratic credibility when acting in these instances. The Court is simply 
saying that Parliament or the state legislative bodies must live up to their 
word. Still, Indian courts have to make decisions about what legislation 
will and will not be enforced as constitutional rights. The courts also 
sometimes make orders that basically create new policy. 
John Hart Ely famously argued that courts should be more willing to 
intervene when there is a greater chance that the democratic process has 
broken down, for instance when a minority group is being discriminated 
 
 
 267. Id. at 5. 
 268. People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India, Order of May 2, 2003, 4–5, 
available at http://www.hrln.org/admin/issue.php?id=14&pil=1&pilid=18 (follow “Supreme Court 
Order 02-05-03”).  
 269. Id. 
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against.270 If this reasoning is applied to social and economic rights 
(something Ely did not have in mind), it could justify the Court acting if, 
for example, AIDS patients were not given reasonable medical treatment 
from the government (a case currently before the Court). Arguably, HIV-
positive persons are discriminated against by the general public. Further, 
AIDS patients might already be so ill when they discover they are HIV-
positive that they cannot engage in the democratic process to change 
opinions about AIDS or lobby for better treatment.  
Situations like the Right to Food Case, though, seem to point to an 
even broader democratic breakdown that the Court is attempting to combat 
in its right to life jurisprudence. What is striking about food security is that 
it affects a majority of India’s population. Most Indians are either 
malnourished themselves or know someone close to them who is.271 
In instances like the Right to Food Case, in which there is arguably no 
stigmatized minority, the Court could claim its interventions combat 
democratic breakdowns on potentially two grounds. First, it might assert 
that Indian citizens do not know what they can or should demand from 
their government. Scholars like Mahendra Singh have argued that many 
Indians conceive of rights against the state differently.272 Either culturally 
they do not believe it is their role to demand more social programs from 
the state, or they do not know that such programs should form a baseline 
of what they should expect from the state.273 For example, many Indians 
who are malnourished may not even conceive of themselves as such. 
Through this lens, the Supreme Court’s orders can be seen as creating and 
enforcing proper norms for the public. 
Alternatively, Indian citizens may know there is a problem that affects 
their right to life, like widespread malnourishment, and believe the 
government should do something about it. However, the political process 
has been unable to successfully implement desired programs. Caste or 
 
 
 270. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
 271. According to the third National Family Health Survey (“NFHS”) (2005–2006), forty-six 
percent of all Indian children under three are underweight, while fifty-six percent of all adult women 
are anemic and thirty-three percent have a below normal body mass. Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare, Gov’t of India, 2005–2006 National Family Health Survey (NFHS-3) National Fact Sheet 
India (Provisional Data), available at http://www.nfhsindia.org/pdf/IN.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2008). 
 Undernourishment in India is only slowly improving with time, and some indicators, like anemia 
in women or the wasting of children (i.e., children becoming too thin for their height), have gotten 
marginally worse in the last decade, despite rapid economic growth during this period.  
 272. Mahendra Singh, supra note 11, at 39–40; see also MARTHA NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 113–14 (2000) (discussing how poverty can 
create entrenched preferences that conflict with “universal norms”). 
 273. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 272. 
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communal lines that dominate Indian politics may end up overshadowing 
voter preferences on many vital policies.274 The Court could justify its 
intervention in these cases by saying that it is simply assuring that 
programs that Indians desire, and that are vital for the health of the 
population, are properly created and implemented.  
Either in holding Parliament to its laws, protecting stigmatized 
minorities, setting baselines for an unaware public, or supporting their 
overshadowed preferences, the Court can argue that it is acting in the 
interest of Indian society, particularly the poor and marginalized. Although 
these explanations may help justify the Court’s actions—and even lend 
them some democratic credibility—it still is not a representative body. 
Indeed, the Court’s actions can arguably discourage Parliament and other 
elected bodies from taking on difficult issues since they know that the 
judiciary will likely take some action if they do not.275 In filling this 
governance vacuum, the Supreme Court may make the other branches less 
accountable and government officials less responsible for decisions that 
are now out of their hands.276 
Further, there is no guarantee that the Supreme Court’s actions will 
only help the poor or further democratic interests.277 Indeed, some contend 
that the Court’s right to life jurisprudence has become a means for 
furthering individual, middle class, or elite interests. Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh has warned that public interest litigation can be used as 
“a tool for obstruction, delay and sometimes even harassment.”278 In 1996, 
a bill was introduced into Parliament (though it never passed) claiming 
that public interest litigation was often misused. It proposed that if a PIL 
 
 
 274. See generally RUDOLPH & HOEBER RUDOLPH, supra note 127, at 20, 57–59. Programs like 
agricultural price subsidies do gain the parties’ attention, but that is because they have a clear impact 
on their voters’ economic outlook and also benefit wealthy land owners who often control the political 
parties. Jason Lakin & Nirmala Ravishankar, Working for Votes: The Employment Guarantee in India 
24 (paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting Philadelphia, PA, 
Aug. 31–Sept. 3, 2006, available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p151215.html).  
 275. AVANI MEHTA SOOD, CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, LITIGATING REPRODUCTIVE 
RIGHTS: USING PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW TO PROMOTE GENDER 
JUSTICE IN INDIA 29 (2006). 
 276. JUSTICE B.N. SRIKRISHNA, SKINNING A CAT 35 (2005); JEREMY RABKIN, JUDICIAL 
COMPULSIONS: HOW PUBLIC LAW DISTORTS PUBLIC POLICY 248 (1989) (making this point in the U.S. 
context). 
 277. William Landes & Richard Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest Group 
Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 893 (1975) (arguing that there is no reason to think courts would 
work as an interest group for the weak and marginalized in only the U.S. context). 
 278. Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India, Speech at the Conference of Chief Ministers & 
Chief Justices of High Courts: Has the Pendulum Swung to the Other Extreme? (Mar. 11, 2006), 
available at http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=20060311&fname=manmohan&sid=1& 
pn=1. 
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petition failed or was shown to be mala fide, the petitioner should be 
imprisoned and pay damages. The bill also criticized the courts for 
prioritizing PIL over other cases that had been pending for years.279 In 
2005, the Court itself stated, “The judiciary has to be extremely careful to 
see whether behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private 
malice, vested interest or publicity seeking is not lurking.”280  
Some have criticized the Court for not adequately taking into account 
the needs of the poor in right to life cases, such as when the Court 
removed encroachers from public forests or closed small-scale polluting 
industries.281 While earlier right to life cases furthered more socialist 
principles embodied in the Directive Principles, critics contend that recent 
cases are more law and order- or middle class-oriented. These criticisms 
highlight that the Court’s increased interventionism is not necessarily 
focused on furthering the interests of the poor. Instead, it is concerned 
with making a governance system work that is too often neglected by the 
country’s representative bodies. Some interventions may more clearly 
favor the poor while others do not. Whether the Court follows a neo-
liberal, socialist, pro-poor, pro-middle class, or other ideology may change 
from bench to bench or decade to decade, yet its push to further principles 
of good governance in these interventions does not. 
The Court, of course, cannot follow any good governance approach it 
likes. The government’s willingness to implement its orders constrains the 
Court’s behavior. Its ability to appeal to India’s constitutional vision or 
standards of civilization also shapes the actions it takes. Public opinion is 
critical. There may be an emerging belief that the Court has overstretched 
and is impairing governance, or on the contrary, that it is not being activist 
enough to protect the common man’s interests. Yet, public opinion is a 
notoriously ill-defined concept, and it is, of course, not a representative 
body that can make concrete decisions. As for now, however, the public 
has rather quietly allowed the Supreme Court to take on many of the roles 
of its representative bodies. This situation may arise out of a lack of 
information about the Court’s current role, an inability to organize to 
challenge it, or acquiescence to or even welcome acceptance of the Court’s 
 
 
 279. Ashok Desai & S. Muralidhar, Public Interest Litigation: Potential and Problems, in 
SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE—ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 159, 180 
(B.N. Kirpal et al. eds., 2000). 
 280. SC Cautions Against Use of PIL, indlaw.com, Dec. 22, 2004, available at http://indlaw.com/ 
769197157EDB544BB0639CB6077F572A.  
 281. Desai & Muralidhar, supra note 279. 
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actions. Regardless of the explanation, the Court’s innovations in public 
interest litigation have achieved a considerable degree of stability. 
D. Institutional Capacity Concerns 
The Indian judiciary has been criticized for having a comparative 
disadvantage to representative institutions with respect to balancing the 
competing needs of society, gathering information necessary to make 
policy decisions, and implementing and monitoring its orders.282 Indeed, 
the Supreme Court has encountered systematic enforcement problems with 
many of its orders in public interest litigation.283 Although the Court has 
hinted at a willingness to sanction government officials in public interest 
litigation if they fail to comply with its orders,284 it almost never actually 
holds them in contempt. Some have criticized the judiciary for being more 
interested in grandiose proclamations that make for good reading in the 
newspaper than actually implementing their orders. Further, the policies at 
issue in much public interest litigation are overseen by a bureaucracy that 
is understaffed, under-trained, under-resourced, and, not surprisingly, 
often corrupt. Even if the central and state governments had the political 
will to fully implement these programs, they would find it difficult to do 
so.  
Despite these obstacles, the Court’s orders in public interest litigation 
have had some impact, frequently considerable. Sometimes the central and 
state governments do comply, or earnestly attempt to comply, with the 
Court’s directions.285 The Court’s orders can also help educate government 
officials about their obligations and provide another voice demanding they 
fulfill these responsibilities.286  
Even when the Court’s decisions have little immediate impact, the 
Court frequently fosters a political space in which its orders can eventually 
be implemented or other policy changes can occur. As Schultz and 
 
 
 282. As Supreme Court Justice B.N. Srikrishna has written, “Sheer expediency or the urge for 
immediate justice in an abstract sense is hardly a justification for taking on problems with myriad fine 
details that the court is ill equipped to handle.” SRIKRISHNA, supra note 276, at 35. 
 283. As Commissioner Saxena put it in the Right to Food Case, there has been “routine violation” 
of the orders by the respondent governments. Almost all of the deadlines the Court gave to the states in 
the Right to Food Case to fully or partially implement its orders were missed. SOCIO LEGAL INFO. 
CTR., supra note 258, at 169. 
 284. Order of Oct. 29, 2002, supra note 266. 
 285. Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimalal Totame, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 630 (commenting on the 
effectiveness of orders). 
 286. People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India, Order of Nov. 18, 2004, 
available at http://www.hrln.org/admin/issue.php?id=14&pil=1&pilid=18 (follow “Supreme Court 
Order 18-11-04” hyperlink). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
56 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 8:1 
 
 
 
 
Gottlieb argue in the U.S. context, “[j]udicial decisions can change 
assumptions . . . through their power to grant legitimacy to certain claims 
and to redefine norms of institutional action.”287 The Court changes 
citizens’ and civil society’s perceptions of their rights, and empowers them 
in new ways to demand these entitlements.288 As a result, civil society 
movements in India often go to the courts when they begin a new political 
campaign.  
A prime example of this dynamic is the Right to Food Campaign, a 
coalition of non-government organizations and individuals that promotes 
food security and the enforcement of the Supreme Court’s right to food 
orders.289 The campaign concentrated its early efforts on enforcing the 
Court’s orders concerning the mid-day meal scheme. In large part because 
of the Court’s orders and the Right to Food Campaign’s synergetic efforts, 
a free mid-day meal is now given in almost all the public primary schools 
in India. The Court’s orders concerning implementing a work-for-food 
scheme, in combination with efforts of the Right to Food Campaign, 
played an important role in the creation of the National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act (“NREGA”).290 The NREGA, which became law in 2005 to 
much fanfare, guarantees employment to one member of every household 
in rural India for one hundred days per year at minimum wage rates or 
above.291 
Similarly, in the early 1990s, two Supreme Court decisions held that 
the right to education was a fundamental right. These rulings helped 
increase pressure on the government to pass a constitutional amendment in 
2002 that clearly stated that the right to education was a fundamental right 
for children between the ages of six and fourteen.292  
 
 
 287. David Schultz & Stephen E. Gottlieb, Legal Functionalism and Social Change: A 
Reassessment of Rosenberg’s The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?, 12 J.L. & 
POL. 63, 74 (1996). 
 288. Singh, supra note 11, at 35–44. 
 289. Right to Food Campaign, A Brief Introduction to the Campaign, http://www.righttofood 
india.org/campaign/campaign.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2008). 
 290. The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, No. 42 of 2005, available at http://india 
code.nic.in/ (search Short Title “National Rural Employment Guarantee Act”). 
 291. Jean Drèze, a leader in the Right to Food Campaign, was one of the Act’s principal authors. 
The Act became law when the Congress Party returned to power in 2004. Several leaders in Congress 
saw NREGA as an important part of their party platform for helping the rural poor and lobbied for it 
within the party. Arguably, the Court’s orders in the Right to Food Case concerning implementation of 
the preexisting work-for-food scheme made it difficult for others in Parliament to oppose a job 
creation scheme like the NREGA. See K. Venkateshwarlu, National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
in Place, THE HINDU, Feb. 3, 2006, available at http://www.hindu.com/2006102/03/stories/200602030 
7241200.htm; Lakin & Ravishankar, supra note 274, at 16.  
 292. A description of the process that created this constitutional amendment can be found in 
Vijayshri Sripathi & Arun K. Thiruvengadam, India: Constitutional Amendment Making the Right to 
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Likewise, in a series of cases beginning in the 1970s, the Court 
articulated a right of the public to government information.293 The Court’s 
decisions were one of the primary impetuses for the far-reaching Right to 
Information Act, which came into law in 2005.294  
The involvement of civil society in making court orders tangible brings 
other problems, though. Government officials complain that they spend 
too much time in court dealing with cases from diverse petitioners, rather 
than actually running government programs. Cases can drag on for years 
as petitioners and the government respond to each other’s often complex 
cases before even the first interim order is given. Many petitioners realize 
that they do not have the capacity to adequately represent an issue only 
after they have brought a case. Court action, especially an unfavorable 
court order, can also impede or demoralize other civil society responses.  
Further, once a social program is declared a right, even for an interim 
period, it becomes difficult for a ministry, the Parliament, or even the 
Court to modify it if reforms are needed.295 The Court’s orders can also 
inadvertently cause the government to prioritize certain programs over 
others.296  
Justices have acknowledged that there may not be judicially 
manageable standards to deal with all of these issues,297 but they still 
intervene out of perceived necessity. They argue that they are encouraging 
government to take on its duties, and are thereby promoting respect for the 
rule of law.298 At the very least, they can act as an “alarm clock” to alert 
Parliament that a social problem has gotten out of hand and needs 
 
 
Education a Fundamental Right, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 148 (2004). 
 293. Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 106; State of Uttar Pradesh v. 
Raj Narain, (1975) 3 S.C.R. 333; People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India, (2004) 
2 S.C.C. 476. 
 294. The Right to Information Act, 2005, No. 22 of 2005; India Code (2005), v. 22. 
 295. Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 915–16 (2001) 
(discussing how, in the United States, welfare reform gutted several federal policies for the American 
poor, even though many argue that welfare reform has ultimately helped poor people more than it has 
hurt them). 
 296. For example, the government vaunted a proposed thirty-five percent increase in the school 
education budget for 2007–2008 to improve the country’s weak primary and secondary school system. 
A large part of this increase, though, went to fund only implementation of the mid-day meal, which 
had been ordered by the Supreme Court, leaving the budget for many other aspects of the school 
system about the same or slightly decreased. Jayati Ghosh, Short Shrift to School Education, 
FRONTLINE (India), Mar. 10–23, 2007, available at http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2405/stories/ 
20070323002304000.htm. 
 297. Avani Mehta Sood, Gender Justice Through Public Interest Litigation: Case Studies from 
India, 41 VANDERBILT J. TRANSNAT’L L. 833, 848 (2008). 
 298. Id. at 846. 
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attention.299 Courts are, after all, well designed to give orders relatively 
clearly and quickly compared to legislative processes that might take 
decades to, or never, materialize.300 Judicial tests of relevance also tend to 
be rigorous, and the judicial process is not as subject to exogenous 
political influences as that of other branches.301  
Courts may have weaknesses when they take on social questions, but 
they also have strengths. The Court’s responsiveness, or perceived 
responsiveness, to many social issues often sits in stark contrast to 
Parliament’s inaction. Despite the manifold criticisms over its 
interventionism, the Supreme Court is still often viewed as more 
competent than the representative branches of government. The Court’s 
recurring inability to follow through on many of its orders has, so far, 
seemingly had only a marginal impact on the legitimacy of its 
interventions.302  
VI. HAS THE GOOD GOVERNANCE COURT GONE GLOBAL? 
The story of the rise of a good governance judiciary in India is 
certainly unique. The shortcomings of India’s representative institutions, 
the Supreme Court’s institutional structure, the development of the basic 
structure doctrine, and the Court’s right to life jurisprudence have all 
combined to create a distinct jurisprudential history. Yet, in other ways, 
the Indian Supreme Court and the circumstances of its rise are not so 
special. In other countries, we see many of the elements that have fostered 
such extensive review powers in India. Indeed, in a broader global trend, 
we find analogous forms of judicial review developing elsewhere.  
Justice Albie Sachs of the South African Constitutional Court has 
argued that in the nineteenth century, the executive achieved control over 
society, in the twentieth century parliament gained control over the 
executive, and in the twenty-first century the judiciary will establish 
principles and norms to control both parliament and the executive.303 
Clearly, India could be pointed to as an example of this proposed historical 
narrative. As Justice Sachs suggests, there are others as well. This section 
 
 
 299. Id. 
 300. As Donald Horowitz writes with regard to the United States: “In the judicial process, 
questions get answers. It is difficult to prevent a judicial decision. No other public or private institution 
is bound to be so responsive.” DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 22 (1977). 
 301. Id. 
 302. SOOD, supra note 275, at 29. 
 303. Albie Sachs, Social and Economic Rights: Can They Be Made Justiciable?, 53 SMU L. REV. 
1381, 1387 (2000). 
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examines judicial corollaries similar to the Supreme Court’s expanded 
right to life jurisprudence and basic structure doctrine that have surfaced 
beyond India’s borders.  
It is outside the scope of this Article to examine how these doctrines 
arose in other countries. Instead, this section merely attempts to show that 
courts outside India are taking on similarly expanded mandates that further 
a broad platform of good governance. The Indian experience may also 
suggest a useful framework to understand why these other courts have 
gained power; more useful, at least, than the U.S. experience. In India, the 
Court’s expansive doctrines were largely judge-made, and certainly were 
not constitutional inevitabilities. In other countries, though, these doctrines 
are often clearly embodied in constitutions.304 Whether included in 
constitutions or judge-made, the repeated appearance of these doctrines, or 
versions of them, suggests that judicial review is transforming in countries 
outside of the United States. This change may be driven by political forces 
similar to those present in India (such as widespread poverty, an 
overriding desire for stability, or perceived shortcomings in representative 
institutions) that are not as ubiquitous in the United States. Critics of 
expanded review powers for judiciaries, whether in India or elsewhere, 
should grapple with why these courts have adapted such a role in the first 
place, before making any blind call to curtail their powers.  
This Article has focused on only two strands of the Indian Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence, although other aspects are also part of its rise in 
power. Similarly, this comparative section will deal only with corollaries 
to these two strands, although the global rise of courts has many other 
sides.305  
A. The Right to Life and Social and Economic Rights  
The Indian Supreme Court’s expanded interpretation of the right to life 
arguably falls under the rubric of social and economic rights 
jurisprudence. This conflation may not be precisely correct, however, 
because the Court’s interpretation of the right to life extends outside of 
what many, including the United Nations, consider classic social and 
economic rights (for example, its orders concerning the enforcement of 
traffic regulations or zoning). Some of these issues of comparison, though, 
 
 
 304. See, e.g., infra notes 310–11 and accompanying text. 
 305. Ran Hirschl’s book, Towards Juristocracy, for example, deals mostly with the judiciary’s 
new role in dealing with matters like the Quebec secession issue in Canada or what a Jewish state is in 
Israel. HIRSCHL, supra note 3. 
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likely arise out of the relative youth of social and economic rights 
jurisprudence.  
Although India began implementing its expanded right to life 
jurisprudence in the 1980s, it was not until the 1990s that the world saw 
routine and often highly interventionist enforcement of social and 
economic rights. The idea of social and economic rights is, of course, not 
new. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Franklin 
Roosevelt’s New Deal are two of several previous important embodiments 
of a commitment to these rights.306 What changed was that courts 
increasingly enforced social and economic rights. Particularly active were 
courts in the new democracies of the developing world in Latin America, 
the country of South Africa, and the states of Eastern Europe. The higher 
judiciaries in other South Asian countries also actively enforced these 
rights. Most of these countries had constitutions that provided a 
transformative social and economic vision to uplift mostly poor 
populations. 
Why this global explosion of judicial intervention happened when it 
did is still relatively under-explored. Important factors likely included the 
failure of Soviet-style communism’s redistributive vision, the failure of 
American-style capitalism to provide a satisfactory alternative model of 
economic justice, the assimilation of local concepts of justice into these 
judiciaries’ jurisprudence, and the export of an American post-war judicial 
activism that centered on addressing deep-rooted social issues.307  
Whatever the larger historical causes might have been, these courts and 
constitutions in the developing world, like in India, were attempting to be 
more relevant to their populations. In South Africa, for example, there was 
an anti-bill of rights movement within the anti-apartheid movement.308 
These critics feared that a bill of rights would only help entrench the 
socio-economic position of whites.309 To help assuage these fears, social 
and economic rights were added to the South African Constitution, so that 
its bill of rights could better advance the claims of the country’s 
dispossessed.310 Social and economic rights were also embraced in 
 
 
 306. For more on President Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms Address” and “Second Bill of Rights 
Address,” as well as greater discussion about Roosevelt’s commitment to the recognition of social and 
economic rights in the United States and abroad, see CASS SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: 
FDR’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER (2004). 
 307. For a general analysis of the global rights revolution see EPP, supra note 3.  
 308. Id. Albie Sachs, The Judicial Enforcement of Socio-economic Rights: The Grootboom Case, 
in DEMOCRATISING DEVELOPMENT: THE POLITICS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
134–35 (Peris Jones & Kristian Stokke eds., 2005). 
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countries like Colombia, which gave its courts a more active role in 
upholding these rights when it redrafted its Constitution in the early 
1990s.311 Increasing the Court’s relevance to ordinary people in Colombia 
was, perhaps, especially important after the judiciary had interpreted the 
Constitution in a formalistic manner in previous decades, allowing many 
civil rights abuses to go unanswered.312  
Many courts that have embraced social and economic rights in the 
developing world have seemingly increased their legitimacy as a result. 
Decisions in these cases are often popular amongst the public and, at the 
same time, difficult for the government to challenge (for example, it is 
hard for any politician to say he or she does not want clean rivers or good 
schools). For a young judiciary struggling to affirm its credibility, social 
and economic rights can be used—consciously or not—as a tool to gain 
more legitimacy and increased authority over other branches of 
government.  
The countries of South Asia, outside of India (Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
Sri Lanka, and Nepal),313 have seen the implementation of social and 
economic rights in a manner perhaps most akin to India. The courts in 
these countries, and their respective constitutions, are heavily influenced 
by each other and the history out of which they arose. For example, each 
of these countries has a highest court with multiple benches, which 
arguably creates a structure more conducive to overseeing social and 
economic rights cases. Additionally, these countries all have populations 
in extreme poverty, which puts greater pressure on the court to develop a 
more economically relevant concept of justice.  
In Nepal, public interest litigation was explicitly made part of the 1991 
Constitution, and the court often interferes in social issues in a manner 
similar to that in India.314 Bangladesh also has developed a public interest 
litigation jurisprudence, with the judiciary intervening in matters like 
ordering that iodine be added to salt for consumers’ health or that two-
stroke engines be removed from Dhaka to fight pollution.315 In Pakistan, 
 
 
 311. Justice Manuel José Cepeda-Espinosa, Judicial Activism in a Violent Context: The Origin, 
Role, and Impact of the Colombian Constitutional Court, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 529, 
543–44 (2004). 
 312. Id. 
 313. Bhutan only recently transitioned from being a monarchy, so it is too early to see how the 
courts there will interpret their mandate. 
 314. CONST. OF NEPAL, art. 88(2). 
 315. Sayed Kamaluddin, BD Judiciary Showing Increasing Assertiveness, PAKISTAN DAWN, Apr. 
4, 2002, available at http://www.dawn.com/2002/04/04/int10.htm; Bangladesh Legal Aid & Servs. 
Trust (BLAST), PIL & Advocacy, http://www.blast.org.bd/ litadvocacy.html (last visited Oct. 4, 
2008). 
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while taking up several cases of public interest litigation, the Supreme 
Court and High Courts have expanded their interpretations of the right to 
life under the Pakistani Constitution and the elements of standing in a 
manner similar to that seen in India.316 More recently, public interest 
litigation in Pakistan has helped situate the Court as a proponent of the 
interests of the public in its larger political battles with the executive and 
the military.317 Sri Lanka has generally less developed public interest 
litigation, but the Court still intervenes in basic governance matters, such 
as outlawing loudspeakers at night (in which it followed precedent from 
India).318  
Latin American courts are also very interventionist with regard to 
protecting social and economic rights. In just one area of social concern, 
courts in Argentina, Venezuela, Columbia, Bolivia, Brazil, and Costa Rica 
have all ordered the government to provide AIDS drugs to those who need 
them.319 Sometimes these orders were for the entire population, while in 
other cases the Court ordered drugs for a specific person or class of 
persons.320 Courts in Latin America have also taken interventionist stands 
on many other social and economic rights. For example, in Colombia the 
 
 
 316. A useful discussion and analysis of PIL in Pakistan can be found in WERNER MENSKI, 
AHMAD RAFAY ALAM, & MEHREEN KASURI RAZA, PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IN PAKISTAN 
(2000). 
 317. Judicial Activism Behind Reference to CJP, THE NATION, May 3, 2007, available at 
http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/may-2007/3/localnews2.php; Imaduddin Ahmed, When Kites Turn 
Lethal, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 21, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/02/21/ 
opinion/edahmed.php.  
 318. Pradeep Kariyawasam, Noise Pollution: Let’s Follow Our Neighbor, THE ISLAND, Dec. 12, 
2007, available at http://www.island.lk/2007/12/12/opinion1.html. 
 319. Decision T-505 of 1992, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), Diego Serna Gomez c. 
Hospital Universitario del Valle “Evaristo Garcia” (Colom. 1992) (Colombian Supreme Court case 
ordering that AIDS treatment must be provided to those who need it); Decision 456 of 2002, Glenda 
López c. Instituto Venezolano de Seguros Sociales (2001) (Venezuelan Supreme Court case ordering 
that ARVs must be provided in a consistent manner); Asociación Benghalensis v. Ministerio de Salud 
y Acción Social, Estado Nacional [L.L. 2000-B] 126 (Argentinian Supreme Court case ordering that 
ARVs be provided in a timely and consistent manner); N.N. v. Moreira Rojas Corte Suprema de 
Justicia de Bolivia, n. 2002-05354-10-RAC (Jan. 8, 2003) (Bolivian Supreme Court case ordering that 
the government cannot stop ARV treatment to a patient once it has begun providing it); Garcia Alvarez 
v. Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (1997), Exp. 5778-V-97, No. 5934-97 (Sala Constitutcional de 
la Corte Suprema de Justicia de Costa Rica) (Costa Rican Constitutional Court decision ordering the 
Nacional Healthcare System to provide ARVs free of charge); Florian F. Hoffman & Fernando R.N.M. 
Bentes, Accountability for Social and Economic Rights in Brazil, in COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra 
note 3, at 100, 113–15 (describing the successful mobilization of civil society in bringing about a 
national HIV/AIDS policy through frequent HIV/AIDS treatment litigation). 
 320. One finds frequent cases involving access to AIDS drugs around the world. See, e.g., supra 
note 229. Likely reasons include the presence of active, relatively well-organized, and often middle 
class HIV-positive populations, in combination with what were originally very high costs of AIDS 
therapy. Castro v. Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social, Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia 
[S.C.J.N.] [Supreme Court], April 2000) (Mex.).  
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Constitutional Court has ordered that public transportation be made 
available to poor sections of society, and that the government provide 
welfare programs to those who have been internally displaced.321  
In South Africa, the Constitutional Court has taken a more reserved yet 
still forceful approach by declaring that the government must take 
reasonable steps to address social and economic problems. The Court has 
found that the government has not made reasonable provision of housing 
within its available resources and ordered it to remedy this situation.322 In 
other countries in Africa, such as Nigeria, the judiciary has also made 
fledgling but substantial social and economic right interventions.323  
In Eastern Europe, the courts of the region’s new democracies have 
occasionally enforced a rather interventionist social and economic rights 
jurisprudence as well. One such instance is the Constitutional Court of 
Hungary’s finding that a reduction of benefits in the country’s welfare 
scheme was unconstitutional.324  
Daniel Brinks and Varun Gauri have compared judicial interventions in 
favor of social and economic rights in Brazil, South Africa, India, Nigeria, 
and Indonesia, focusing particularly on the right to health.325 They find 
that these interventions are more extensive in robust democracies (i.e., 
Brazil, South Africa, and India) and are more limited in countries where a 
democracy, and its judiciary, have come under more severe stress and 
challenge (i.e., Nigeria and Indonesia).326 They argue that judiciaries that 
set norms for government social interventions do not necessarily compete 
directly with representative institutions.327 Instead, they largely 
supplement or spur the actions of these representative institutions.  
Yet, even in this way, these judiciaries provide a good governance 
check on the institutions and the administrative states they oversee. It is 
too early to know what global judicial norms may evolve out of this 
process, but courts have now clearly become a part of social and economic 
policy setting and enforcement across the world.  
 
 
 321. Cepeda-Espinosa, supra note 311, at 613–14. 
 322. Gov’t of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Irene Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at 
¶ 99(2)(a) (S. Afr.). 
 323. GAURI & BRINKS, supra note 3. 
 324. Constitutional Court of Hungary Decision 43/1995 of June 30, 1995, on Social Security 
Benefits.  
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B. The Basic Structure Doctrine, Un-amendable Constitutions, and New 
Structural Checks on Democratic Institutions 
In India, the basic structure doctrine serves a purpose similar to un-
amendable provisions or principles in a constitution. After World War II, 
several constitutions were created with un-amendable provisions. 
Germany is the most prominent example,328 but there are others as well. 
These countries adopted varying approaches. The constitutions of Greece 
and Portugal provide a relatively long list of un-amendable provisions.329 
Others protect only one or two key principles. The Constitutions of Italy 
and France, for example, simply safeguard their republican form of 
government against amendment.330  
Perhaps not surprisingly, Pakistan is the country that has most closely 
flirted with an approach that looks most similar to the Indian basic 
structure doctrine. Even after the Kesavananda Bharati decision in India, 
the judiciary in Pakistan rejected the idea of there being any substantive 
limits on amendments to the Constitution.331 However, in 1997, the 
Pakistani Supreme Court reopened this question when deciding whether an 
amendment that allowed the President to dissolve the National Assembly 
was valid.332 Although it did not strike down the amendment, the seven-
justice bench, speaking through Chief Justice Ali Shah, found that the 
salient features of the preamble of the Constitution (which had been the 
preamble of all four of Pakistan’s constitutions) must be retained and not 
altered.333 These unchangeable features were “federalism; parliamentary 
democracy and Islamic provisions including independence of judiciary.”334 
Suddenly, Pakistan seemed to have a basic structure doctrine as well. Yet, 
the very next year, another seven-justice bench found that there was no 
basic structure doctrine, apparently overruling this new precedent.335 Since 
then, the Court has leaned both ways, at times professing a basic structure 
doctrine while at other times eschewing it.336 It has yet to be seen whether 
the Court will ultimately solidify or discard this doctrine.  
 
 
 328. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 329. 1975 Syntagma [SYN] [Constitution] 110, 2, 4–5, 13, 26 (Greece); CONST. OF PORTUGAL, 
art. 288. 
 330. 1958 CONST. 89 (Fr.); COST., art. 139 (Italy). 
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1254–76 (2006). 
 332. Mahmood Khan Achakzai v. Fed’n of Pakistan PLD 1997 SC 426. 
 333. Id. ¶ 56. 
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Through a judge-made basic structure doctrine or un-amendable 
constitutional provisions, courts are being given a new structural role, 
acting as a review body, not only for laws, but also constitutional 
amendments. This role is part of a larger trend of creating new structural 
checks on representative bodies through courts more generally. 
In Thailand, the 2007 Constitution, which was drafted by a military 
junta and passed by democratic referendum, prohibits amendments that 
“chang[e] the democratic regime of government with the King as Head of 
State or chang[e] the form of State.”337 This passage is a typical un-
amendable constitutional provision, but the Constitution goes even further 
by giving the judiciary new powers to control representative bodies. The 
upper judiciary has an almost controlling hand in appointing half of the 
Senate.338 The Senate, along with the King, in turn approves the heads of 
quasi-independent bodies, such as the ombudsman, public prosecutor, and 
state audit commission.339 The Senate and these quasi-independent bodies 
all act to check the power of the House of Representatives and 
executive.340 
In Iran, the Constitution makes both its Islamic and democratic 
character un-amendable, as well as the objectives of the Republic (which 
include many social and economic goals), but here, too, the Constitution 
goes even further.341 The Guardian Council in Iran must approve all laws 
passed by Parliament and can veto them if they violate either Islamic law 
or the Constitution.342 The Council also supervises elections and has the 
power to ban candidates from running.343 In this way, the Council acts like 
a mixture of a constitutional court, an upper chamber or Parliament, and an 
 
 
structure doctrine in Pakistan at present, see FAZAL KARIM, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PUBLIC ACTIONS: A 
TREATISE ON JUDICIAL REVIEW (2006). 
 337. SOMDET PHRA PARAMINTHARAMAHA BHUMIBOL ADULYADEJ [INTERIM CONSTITUTION] 
B.E. 2549 (2006), ch. 15 (Thail.). 
 338. Id. § 113. 
 339. Chang Noi, From People’s Charter to Judge’s Charter, THE NATION, Apr. 30, 2007, 
available at http://www.nationmultimedia.com/search/page.arcview.php?clid=11&id=30033003&date 
=2007-04-30; CONST. OF THE KINGDOM OF THAIL., ch. 113 (also providing for extensive directive 
principles to guide Parliament’s lawmaking). The quasi-independent bodies include the Ombudsman, 
id. art. 242; Election Commission, art. 229; National Counter Corruption Commission, art. 246; State 
Audit Commission art. 252; Public Prosecutor, art. 255; National Human Rights Commission, art. 256.  
 340. The judiciary reportedly did not want this more political role, as it feared it would become 
contaminated by the political process, but ended up this way regardless. Draft Constitution: Judges 
Oppose Appointments’ Role, THE NATION, May 2, 2007, available at http://nationmultimedia.com/ 
2007/05/02/politics/politics_30033161.php. 
 341. Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri’i Isla’mai Iran [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF 
IRAN] 177(5) [1980]. 
 342. Id. art. 94. 
 343. Id. art. 99. 
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election commission. The latter two are new roles that this judicial 
institution was given to check Iran’s representative institutions. This 
judicial setup helps maintain the power of the Supreme Leader, as half of 
the Council is appointed by the Supreme Leader, while the other half is 
appointed by the head of the judiciary (who is also appointed by the 
Supreme Leader).344  
In Bangladesh, where the two principal political parties are viciously 
distrustful of each other, the Constitution directs a retired Chief Justice or 
another retired member of the higher judiciary to head a caretaker 
government during elections.345 This function marks a new institutional 
role for the judiciary, or more accurately the retired judiciary, to check the 
representative branches.  
These new institutional arrangements in Thailand, Iran, and 
Bangladesh vividly illustrate how courts have risen in power, often out of 
an anxiety surrounding, or distrust of, representative institutions. Iran and 
arguably Thailand are also clear examples of how the broad role 
judiciaries now play can be used by elites to maintain power, or at least to 
ensure that representative institutions do not run too far afoul of their 
interests. At the same time the basic structure doctrine in India, and its 
fledgling arrival in Pakistan, can more easily be seen as cases of courts 
interfering to ensure the survival and operation of democratic institutions. 
It is unlikely that we have seen a final synthesis of how judiciaries regulate 
representative institutions and their constituent functions.  
C. The Spread of Good Governance Courts 
Courts are providing new checks on representative institutions. These 
checks, as the Indian example has highlighted, develop out of an economic 
and political context. In response to the needs of a poor population and the 
perceived shortcomings of the government’s representative institutions, 
the Indian Supreme Court crafted an expansive right to life jurisprudence. 
 
 
 344. Id. arts. 91, 157. 
 345. If no retired member of the higher judiciary is available or willing, an impartial citizen is 
appointed. CONST. OF BANGLADESH, art. 58B–C. In 2006, the primary opposition party in Bangladesh 
protested that the former Chief Justice who was to oversee the caretaker government was not impartial. 
After the Chief Justice refused to take on the position, the President was eventually sworn in to head 
the caretaker government. Amid violent protests in 2007, the President declared a state of emergency, 
which led to the military backing of a caretaker government. This may signal an end to the retired 
judiciary’s role in caretaker governments in the future. See Bangladesh President to Lead Caretaker 
Government, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, Oct. 30, 2006, http://english.people.com.cn/200610/ 
30/eng20061030_316328.html; Simon Robinson, Bangladesh’s State of Emergency, TIME, Jan. 25, 
2007, available at http://www.time.com/time/ magazine/article/0,9171,1582121,00.html. 
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Out of a distrust of Parliament’s constituent power, and the confirmation 
of those fears during the Emergency, the Court created the basic structure 
doctrine. These two doctrines are largely foreign to the American judicial 
experience, on which the Indian Supreme Court was originally modeled. 
India’s experience provides a potential explanation for why judiciaries in 
other countries have been given or have created similar expanded powers.  
This Article has argued that, in India, this broadening of the Court’s 
powers has been justified by principles of good governance or civilization. 
It is outside the limits of this Article to examine whether similar 
justifications were put forward elsewhere. Regardless, the courts described 
in this section are implementing more elements of what could be 
considered meta-governance–aspects of governance that are claimed to be 
non-negotiable. This appears to be part of a global shift to check 
representative institutions with increasingly broad principles of good 
governance.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
One should not mistake the rise of the good governance judiciary in 
India as the rise of judicial rule. Instead, it marks a new form of 
coexistence between democratic and good governance principles in ruling; 
one in which, as we have seen, the judiciary must face considerable 
enforcement and legitimacy concerns. This coexistence is likely to evolve 
substantially in the coming years, creating lessons for other courts with 
similar good governance roles.  
First, representative institutions in India may begin to crowd out the 
Court by asserting themselves more strongly or increasing their (real or 
perceived) competence. Such changes could occur naturally within these 
institutions’ current formation, or alternatively through their restructuring. 
There have been several high-profile suggestions to strengthen the 
credibility and cohesion of India’s representative institutions that would 
affect their relationship with the judiciary. The National Commission to 
Review the Working of the Constitution has proposed that Parliament 
seats should be won by a clear majority of the vote to combat political 
fragmentation and create more legitimacy.346 Alternatively, Arun Shorie 
has suggested weakening the powers of Parliament and, instead, creating a 
 
 
 346. Chopra, supra note 193, at 47 (mentioning proposal by National Commission to review the 
working of the Constitution to award Parliament seats to candidates receiving a minimum of fifty 
percent of the votes plus one instead of just the highest share of total).  
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strong President to offset the power of a strong Supreme Court.347 Others 
have argued that India needs more local democracy and autonomy so that 
citizens have a vested and meaningful stake in decisions that affect their 
lives.348  
Second, no matter how the more representative institutions evolve, the 
Court could end up limiting its own authority. Justices on the Court may 
advocate a narrower role for themselves because of outside pressure or 
their own personal understandings of the Court’s role. They could also 
unintentionally reduce their authority by making highly publicized bad 
governance or unpopular decisions. There is already a growing perception 
of corruption on the Court, which could further weaken the Court’s image 
and power.349 Further, the public may grow tired of the judiciary’s right to 
life decisions only being partially followed or not at all. The Court’s 
institutional capacity deficit could eventually lead to perceived over-
stretch and a legitimacy crisis. 
Third, the Court is facing a fracturing of its own authority. The 
judiciary, like Parliament, has seen an increase in the creation and use of 
other bodies that attempt to bypass its own shortcomings. Wealthier 
litigants have used arbitration to try to circumvent the delays of the 
courts.350 Also, to reduce backlogs, the Supreme Court itself has promoted 
the use of lok adalats, local informal courts, from which one cannot 
appeal, that largely settle disputes between poorer litigants.351 Shariat 
Courts are being promulgated to deal with many personal law issues 
within the Muslim community without having to take cases to the national 
judiciary.352 The development of independent electricity and 
telecommunications authorities has also seen the rise of independent 
tribunals that take disputes in these areas out of the realm of lower courts 
 
 
 347. SHOURIE, supra note 29. The desire to create a strong President to overcome the fractured 
nature of politics in India has a long tradition in Indian politics. See BRASS, supra note 15, at 344–45. 
 348. Peter Ronald DeSouza, The ‘Second Wind’ of Democracy in India, in INDIA’S LIVING 
CONSTITUTION 370 (Zoya Hasan, E. Sridharan, R. Sudarshan eds., 2002) (providing a brief overview 
of past efforts to decentralize Indian democracy as well as commenting on the decentralization 
resulting from amendment 73 to the Indian Constitution). 
 349. Venkitesh Ramakrishnan, Speaker Expresses Surprise over CJI’s Reported Stand on Hearing 
Teesta Setalvad, THE HINDU, Feb. 25, 2008.  
 350. LAW COMM’N OF INDIA, ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY SIXTH REPORT ON THE ARBITRATION 
AND CONCILLIATION (AMENDMENT) BILL, 2001 (2001), available at http://lawcommissionof 
india.nic.in/arb.pdf (last accessed Nov. 15, 2008) (describing development of legal framework for 
arbitration in India). 
 351. See, e.g., V. Venkatesan, Hold More Local Adalats, CJI Tells High Courts, THE HINDU, May 
4, 2008.  
 352. These independent Islamic courts have even been challenged in the Indian Supreme Court as 
creating a second judiciary. See Plea Against Shariat Courts Admitted, THE HINDU, Apr. 6, 2007. 
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and High Courts. Human rights commissions, such as the National Human 
Rights Commission or the Child Rights Commission, have been created in 
part because the judiciary has failed to check abusive government policies 
through public interest or ordinary litigation. Currently, the Supreme Court 
has the power to review the decisions of these bodies or otherwise monitor 
them (at least theoretically), but their proliferation points to broader 
inadequacies within the judiciary itself. How these bodies evolve, and 
whether they gain more independence, will likely affect how the Court 
interprets its good governance role.  
Finally, other government bodies besides the legislature, executive, or 
judiciary, may gain authority. Already, the rise of some of the unelected 
bodies in India, such as the Election Commission and the Securities and 
Exchange Board, has been discussed.353 These and other unelected bodies 
will likely play an important future governance role in India. India may 
also see the rise of more elected bodies. For example, water user 
associations, which are representative bodies of local land owners, have 
proliferated in India in an attempt to decentralize decision-making over 
government irrigation projects.354 Other elected or unelected bodies, either 
local or national, could arise to play a central role in governing. 
India, like many countries, is a country grappling to govern itself. To 
aid in this undertaking, the Indian Supreme Court has evolved 
significantly from its largely American model to enforce principles of 
good governance to check the perceived deficiencies of the country’s 
representative institutions. In attempting to describe this transformation, 
this Article leaves many questions to be answered. Is the rise of a good 
governance Court healthy for Indian democracy? Are the good governance 
principles that the Court articulates shaped by elite biases, veiled class 
interests, transcendent necessities of reason, or other forces? This 
descriptive analysis, though, tips us off to needed analysis. That courts in 
other parts of the world and unelected bodies more broadly have 
increasingly functioned to enforce good governance principles 
demonstrates that the world’s democracies are in a particularly dynamic 
state. Given India’s growing importance as the world’s largest democracy, 
how the country balances representative and good governance reasoning in 
its institutions of political authority is likely to have a wide impact on how 
democracy evolves around the world. 
 
 
 353. See supra Part II.G. 
 354. VIDEH UPADHYAY, A RIGHTS BASED APPROACH TO WATER USER ASSOCIATIONS IN INDIA 
(2006), available at http://www.ielrc.org/activities/workshop_0612/content/d0620.pdf (providing a 
general description of the emerging role of water user associations in regulating irrigation in India). 
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